The Game Changer: \u3cem\u3eCitizens United\u3c/em\u3e\u27s Impact on Campaign Finance Law in General and Corporate Political Speech in Particular by Bopp, James Jr. et al.
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
Volume 9 | Issue 2 Article 4
12-1-2010
The Game Changer: Citizens United's Impact on
Campaign Finance Law in General and Corporate
Political Speech in Particular
James Jr. Bopp
Joseph E. La Rue
Elizabeth M. Kosel
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/falr
Part of the First Amendment Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in First Amendment
Law Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
James J. Bopp, Joseph E. La Rue & Elizabeth M. Kosel, The Game Changer: Citizens United's Impact on Campaign Finance Law in General
and Corporate Political Speech in Particular, 9 First Amend. L. Rev. 251 (2018).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/falr/vol9/iss2/4
THE GAME CHANGER: CITIZENS UNITED'S
IMPACT ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW IN
GENERAL AND CORPORATE POLITICAL
SPEECH IN PARTICULAR
JAMES BoPP, JR.,* JOSEPH E. LA RUE,**& ELIZABETH M. KoSEL***
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction................ ..................... ..... 255
I. The First Amendment was Crafted to Protect Speech. ............. 257
A. The First Amendment protects speech regardless
of the speaker's identity ............... ................. 257
B. Other constitutional provisions employ the terms
"person" or "citizen," further demonstrating the First
Amendment's speech protective purpose ............... 259
C. The First Amendment protects corporate speech..... ..... 260
D. What the Citizens United critics argue and why
they are wrong .................................. 262
James Bopp, Jr., B.A., Indiana University, 1970; J.D., University of Florida,
1973; Attorney, Bopp, Coleson & Bostrom, Terre Haute, Ind.; General Counsel,
James Madison Center for Free Speech; former Co-Chairman of the Election Law
Committee of the Free Speech and Election Law Practice Group of the Federalist
Society; Commissioner, National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State
Laws. Mr. Bopp was counsel for the plaintiff in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission in the district court and prepared their jurisdictional statement upon
which the Supreme Court granted review. He has argued six campaign finance and
judicial speech cases before the United States Supreme Court.
" Joseph E. La Rue received his B.B.L. and B.Th. from Ozark Christian
College in 1992 and his J.D. from Notre Dame Law School in 2006. Mr. La Rue is
an Attorney with Bopp, Coleson & Bostrom in Terre Haute, Ind.
** Elizabeth M. Kosel received her B.A. from Marquette University in 2004
and her J.D. from Ave Maria School of Law in 2010. Ms. Kosel is an Attorney with
Bopp, Coleson & Bostrom in Terre Haute, Ind.
252
II. From Person to Persona Non Grata: The Treatment of Corporations
Under Campaign Finance Law from Belotti to McConnell..................264
A. Bellotti held that the First Amendment protects
speech, regardless of the speaker ............. ...... 264
1. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
wrongly decided corporations have only limited
First Amendment rights ............. ......... 265
2. The United States Supreme Court held that speech
may not be regulated simply because the speaker
is a corporation............................ 267
B. MCFL suggested that restrictions targeting corporate
Political speech might be constitutional ...... ........ 271
1. MCFL was a carve-out exemption to an
unconstitutional law................ ........ 274
2. MCFL was a tacit approval of censoring speech of
of disfavored speakers.............. ............. 276
C. Austin held that the government may ban corporate
independent expenditures because they are made by
corporations ............................ ..... 278
1. The corporate speech ban was unconstitutional
under Buckleys rule that independent expenditures
may not be limited ..... .................... 282
2. The corporate speech ban was unconstitutional under
Buckleys rule that speech equalization rationales
are constitutionally infirm..........................284
3. The corporate speech ban was unconstitutional
under Buckleys rule that First Amendment freedoms
are not contingent on the wealth of the speaker........... 284
4. The corporate speech ban was unconstitutional
under Bellotti's rule that government may not
discriminate against corporate speakers ..... ..... 285
5. The Austin court abandoned its First Amendment
precedent because of policy concerns ................. 286
D. Beaumont held that the government may ban corporate
contributions because they are made by corporations........... 289
1. The district court held that both the expenditure
and contribution bans were unconstitutional as
applied to NCRL ..................... ...... 291
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 9
2. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's
decision .............. ................... 293
3. The Supreme Court reversed, thereby allowing
the government's ban of corporate contributions ........ 293
4. The Supreme Court's Beaumont decision was
poorly reasoned and wrongly decided ............... 295
a. The interests in preventing corruption and
and protecting dissenting shareholders are
inapplicable to advocating corporation's
speech ............... ............. 295
b. The PAC-option had already been rejected
to protect speech rights ....... . ................ 298
c. Strict scrutiny should have been applied to
section 441's ban on political speech and
association ................... ...... 301
i. Law compelling corporations to employ
PACs to engage in First Amendment
activity are subject to strict scrutiny ........ 302
ii. Laws restricting contributions are
subject to strict scrutiny ....... ..... 303
a. Buckley evaluated the challenged
contribution limits under strict
scrutiny................. ..... 303
b. Contribution bans must be evaluated
under strict scrutiny ........ ..... 307
d. The Court accepted a public distrust of
corporate contributions as adequate
justification for banning them ........................ 308
E. McConnell held that the government may ban corporate
electioneering communications because they are made by
corporations ....................................... 310
III. Wisconsin Right to Life: The Return to a Focus on Speech in
First Amendment jurisprudence..................................312
IV. Citizens United: The "Return[] to the Principle Established
in Buckley and Bellotti that the Government May Not Suppress
Political Speech on the Basis of the Speaker's Corporate
Identity ............ .......... ................... 316
A. The government may not discriminate among speakers....... 322
20111 CITIZENS UNITED 253
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
B. There is no inherent danger in the corporate form................ 325
C. The interest in preventing financial quid pro quo
is only cognizable interest for restricting speech and
association ....................................... 325
D. Bans on political speech are not permissible remedies.........327
E. PACs cannot speak for their connected corporations............328
F. Law burdening speech are subject to strict scrutiny.............. 330
G. In the First Amendment context, courts owe no
deference to the remedy government chooses to alleviate
problems...................... .............. 331
V. Citizens United's Implications for Campaign Finance Law:
"More Speech, Not Less, Is the Governing Rule."............331
A. Citizens United explicitly holds that it is unconstitutional
to require corporations to employ PACs to speak or
associate................................... 332
B. Citizens United necessarily means that it is
unconstitutional to limit contributions to committees
making independent expenditures........... .................. 338
C. Contribution limits burden speech and therefore must be
evaluated under strict scrutiny ............... ...... 340
1. Contributions are political speech... ... ............... 341
2. "Law imposing burdens on political speech must
be evaluated under strict scrutiny ..... .......... 344
3. While contribution limits may be permissible,
bans are not ....................... ....... 347
D. Citizens United's holding and reasoning demands that
Beaumont be reconsidered and overruled...........................348
1. Citizens United's holding demands that Beaumont
be reconsidered and overruled ............. ..... 349
2. Citizens United's reasoning demands that Beaumont
be reconsidered and overruled ......... ......... 350
a. Beaumont impermissibly allowed the
government to discriminate among speakers .... 351
b. Beaumont impermissibly found a corruption
interest in the corporate form........ ....... 352
c. Beaumont impermissibly ruled that corporations
could speak and associate through their
PACs ............................ 353
254 [Vol. 9
CITIZENS UNITED
d. Beaumont failed to apply strict scrutiny to
the corporate contribution ban .......................... 355
3. Citizens United's rejection on the interests Beaumont
relied upon demands that Beaumont be reconsidered
and overruled ............................. 356
a. Beaumont relied upon the antidistortion
interest, which Citizens United invalidated ..... 356
b. Beaumont relied upon the shareholder
protection interest, which Citizens United
invalidated.......................... 359
c. Beaumont relied upon anti-influence
interest, which Citizens United invalidated ..... 359
d. Beaumont relied upon the anti-circumvention
interest, which Citizens United discredited..... 360
Conclusion .................................... ..... 362
INTRODUCTION
In 1978, the Supreme Court decided First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti,1 ruling that the First Amendment protects speech
regardless of who the speaker is.2 This meant that speech and association
did not lose its protection just because the First Amendment actor was a
corporation. It also meant that corporate speech and association was just
like individuals' speech and association, in that it could not be limited
without a compelling state interest. The Bellotti Court further ruled that
there was no such interest inherent in the corporate form. So, the Court
said, when the First Amendment does not allow government to limit a
particular type of speech and association, it makes no difference that the
First Amendment actor is a corporation. Government is constitutionally
forbidden from limiting First Amendment activity on the basis of the
corporate form of the actor. Under Bellotti, corporations were thus able
to engage in the same political speech and association as people could.
1. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
2. For an analysis of Bellotti, see infra Section II.A.
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Corporate speech and association was gradually whittled away
by subsequent decisions. In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,
the Court upheld a ban on corporations' "independent expenditures."4 In
Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont,' the Court upheld a ban on
corporate contributions to candidates and committees. And in McConnell
v. Federal Election Commission,6 the Court upheld a ban on corporate
7
electioneering communications. The effect of these three cases was to
silence corporate political speech, simply because they were
corporations. This ran afoul of the rule announced in Bellotti.
The tide began to turn with Federal Election Commission v.
Wisconsin Right to Life,' which returned the focus of corporate First
Amendment analysis to speech, where Bellotti said it belonged. Then in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,9 the Court explicitly
returned to Bellotti's rule by overruling Austin and the offending part of
3. 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 558 U.S. , 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). For an analysis of Austin, see infra
Section II.C.
4. An "independent expenditure" is defined by federal law as:
[A]n expenditure by a person-
(A) expressly advocating the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate; and
(B) that is not made in concert or cooperation with
or at the request or suggestion of such candidate, the
candidate's authorized political committee, or their
agents, or a political party committee or its agents.
2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (2006). To be regulable as an independent expenditure, the
speech must contain "express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as 'vote
for,' 'elect,' support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,'
'defeat,' 'reject."' Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976).
5. 539 U.S. 146 (2003). For an analysis of Beaumont, see infra Section
II.D.
6. 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. , 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010). For an analysis of
McConnell, see infra Section II.E.
7. Electioneering communications are essentially targeted, broadcast ads
naming federal candidates in 30- and 60-day periods before primaries and general
elections, respectively. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3) (2006).
8. 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
9. 558 U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010). James Bopp, Jr., and his firm,
Bopp, Coleson & Bostrom, served as counsel for Citizens United in the district court
and prepared the jurisdictional statement upon which the Supreme Court granted
review. When Citizens United retained Ted Olson as lead counsel, we withdrew.
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McConnell and holding that the government may not ban general-fund
corporate independent expenditures or electioneering communications.o
Citizens United, though, has even broader application. Its holding and
reasoning necessitates that Beaumont be reconsidered and overturned,
thereby allowing corporate persons to exercise their First Amendment
right to make contributions. This article explains why that is so and
offers suggestions for how campaign finance law should develop in the
wake of Citizens United.
Part I of this article explains that the First Amendment was
crafted to protect speech. Part II considers the speech-protective
principles announced in Bellotti and then examines the cases announcing
the slow but steady erosion of corporate First Amendment rights. Part III
describes the Wisconsin Right to Life decision, which was a harbinger of
the Court's change of direction regarding corporate political speech. Part
IV considers the Citizens United decision, explaining how the Court
returned to its earlier, speech-protective principles in declaring that
corporate persons have the right to speak. Part V argues that the
reasoning of Citizens United, if not the holding itself, requires that
Beaumont be overruled, thereby allowing corporate persons to exercise
their First Amendment rights of speech and association by making
contributions.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT WAS CRAFTED To PROTECT SPEECH.
A. The First Amendment protects speech regardless of the speaker's
identity.
Historically, the Court has relied upon alternative theories for its
decisions granting constitutional protections to corporations. One such
theory was "artificial entity theory."" But the artificial entity theory soon
10. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 913.
11. For an in-depth consideration of the artificial entity theory, see Carl J.
Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41
HASTINGS L.J. 577, 579-82 (1990). See also Dale Rubin, Corporate Personhood:
How the Courts Have Employed Bogus Jurisprudence to Grant Corporations
Constitutional Rights Intended for Individuals, 28 QUINNIPlAC L. REV. 523, 534-48
(2010). Chief Justice Marshall described corporations as "artificial being[s],
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came into conflict with the "person theory" of corporations. Debate
over these doctrines has reignited in the wake of the Supreme Court's
Citizens United decision.13 While this debate is relevant to certain
constitutional provisions, it is irrelevant to the First Amendment.
The First Amendment operates as a prohibition on government
regulation of speech. And it protects speech without regard to who the
speaker is. Thus, the First Amendment is activity-protective rather than
actor-protective. The language of the First Amendment demonstrates a
deliberate intent to prohibit government regulation of speech.
The Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech."1 4 This language guards against the
danger of government squelching the ability of the governed to freely
and robustly discuss issues those men determine important to self-
governance. The importance of ideas is not to be determined by
government but by the governed; and the First Amendment protects
against the imposition of the government's judgment upon the governed.
Fundamental to maintaining diversity of ideas, which is so important to
maintaining a democracy, is an "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"
public discourse. The Supreme Court recognizes this and therefore
maintains speech-protective rules. This is particularly true, and ought to
be so, when public discourse pertains to public affairs because the First
Amendment is designed to "protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs."' 6
However, the First Amendment does not absolutely protect all
speech. There are limits on the freedom of speech in order that society
may function. But it is only within narrow areas of unprotected speech
that government may regulate. If speech falls within areas of protected
invisible, intangible, and existing only in the contemplation of law." Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819). As "creatures of law,"
corporations have "only those properties which the charter of creation confer on it."
Id.
12. Mayer, supra note 11, at 579-82. The "natural entity theory"
maintains that under the Constitution corporations are the same as persons and so
enjoy the same constitutional rights and protections as individuals. Id.
13. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct.
876 (2010).
14. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
15. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
16. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
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speech, government may not regulate the speech unless the government
demonstrates a sufficiently important interest to justify the infringement
on First Amendment activity.
Political speech is at the core of First Amendment protection. 17
Thus, political speech may only be regulated upon the government's
demonstration of a compelling interest.' Absent a compelling
government interest, political speech may not be infringed. Political
contributions and expenditures are recognized as political speech' 9 and
therefore, any infringement on these First Amendment activities must be
justified by a sufficiently important government interest.
B. Other constitutional provisions employ the terms "person" or
"citizen, "further demonstrating the First Amendment's speech
protective purpose.
While the First Amendment is stated in the absolute, "Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . o" ther
Constitutional provisions employ the language of "person" or "citizen."
Under these provisions, an individual must fall within the protected
"group" to enjoy the provision's protection. For example, the Fourteenth
Amendment states,
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. 2 1
Also, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment identifies "citizens" as the subject of the constitutional
22protection. The conscious use of "citizen" and "person" compared with
the use of prohibitory language the government "shall make no law"
illustrates the Framers intent to distinguish and vary the applicability of
17. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at , 130 S. Ct. 898.
18. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 898.
19. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
21. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
22. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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sections and provisions of the Constitution. And the Court has applied
the various provisions in accordance with the scope of protection
intended by the Framers and those ratifying the amendments. Thus, the
language of the First Amendment when compared to other constitutional
provisions demonstrates the intent that the First Amendment operates as
a general prohibition against government regulation of speech, rather
than a limitation on particular government action targeted toward
particular groups of persons.
C. The First Amendment protects corporate speech.
In 1936, the Supreme Court decided Grosjean v. American Press
Co., Inc.,2 3 in which media corporations challenged a law as
unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The Court held that the
First Amendment protected corporate speech.24 Then in First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,2 5 the Court again held that the political speech
of a for-profit bank was protected by the First Amendment. And while
political speech is at the core of First Amendment protection, non-
political speech is also deserving of protection, again, regardless of the
speaker's identity. The Court demonstrated this principle in Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Services Commission of New York,26 in which the
Court held that public utility companies have the right to promote their
views - i.e., speak - via the monthly billing envelope sent to their
customers. And later, in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities
Commission of California,27 the Court struck down a requirement that
public utilities include public interest groups' opposing views in the
utility company's billing envelope.
Following Grosjean but prior to Bellotti, Consolidated Edison,
and Pacific Gas, the Supreme Court decided New York Times Co. v.
28Sullivan. This case is remembered as the one that established the
"actual malice" standard for public figures attempting to make out a libel
23. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
24. Id. at 250.
25. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
26. 447 U.S. 530 (1978).
27. 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
28. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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claim.29 Additionally, it has important ramifications for corporate First
Amendment jurisprudence. Again, the Court affirmed the principle that
the First Amendment protects speech because it is speech and not
because of the speaker's identity.
At issue in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan was the
constitutionality of Alabama's libel law. Sullivan, the plaintiff in the
court below, was an elected Commissioner in Montgomery, Alabama. 30
He alleged that The New York Times was guilty of libel because it printed
an advertisement that allegedly libeled him.3 1 The Alabama state courts
found against the New York Times Co.32 The United States Supreme
Court reversed, ruling that the Alabama libel law was "constitutionally
deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for freedom of speech and
of the press that are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments in
a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official
conduct." 3
3
The significant fact for the development of corporate First
Amendment law, however, is that the Court afforded no special
protection to The New York Times because it was a media corporation.
Had the Court thought that the Times' status as a member of the press
somehow insulated it from libel charges, it would have said so. Yet, it
did not. Rather, there is no hint whatsoever in this decision that The New
York Times' speech enjoyed greater protection than would a for-profit
business corporation. And in fact, it does not. As the Supreme Court said
in Citizens United: "We have consistently rejected the proposition that
the institutional press has any constitutional privilege beyond that of
other speakers."34 This echoed Justice Brennan's comment that "the
rights of the institutional media are no greater and no less than those
enjoyed by other individuals or organizations engaged in the same
29. Id. at 283.
30. Id. at 256.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 256-64.
33. Id. at 264.
34. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S._, , 130 S.
Ct. 876, 905 (2010) (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce., 494 U.S. 652,
691 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. _, 130
S. Ct. 876 (citing First Nat'1 Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 782 (1978))).
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activities."35 Whatever First Amendment rights media corporations enjoy
are theirs on the basis that they are able to speak, not because they are
media corporations.
It is understood today that corporations enjoy First Amendment
rights not because they are "persons" or "citizens" but because they are
able to speak. The status of their speech then determines the extent to
which the speech is protected under the First Amendment. Thus,
corporations' speech enjoys the same protections as speech of
individuals. The level of government interest required to be demonstrated
is determined by the type of speech, with political speech requiring a
compelling government interest to justify any government regulation.
D. What the Citizens United critics argue and why they are wrong.
As discussed and demonstrated above, because the First
Amendment operates as a prohibition on government regulation of
speech rather than as a grant of rights based upon the identity of the one
speaking, criticism of Citizens United's recognition that the First
Amendment protects corporate speech is misplaced. It is also dangerous
because it demonstrates a misunderstanding at best, and at worst a
rewriting, of the First Amendment's language and intent.
For example, one commentator criticized the Court for ruling
"that corporations such as Consolidated Megacorp have to be treated the
same as living, breathing 'persons."' 36 Another group writes to offer
"proposed 'fixes' to the damage done to American democracy by the
Supreme Court's Citizens United decision" for allowing corporations to
engage in political speech.37 Other authors, writing prior to the Citizens
35. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
784 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that at least five other Justices agreed
with his statement).
36. E.J. Dionne, Jr., The Price of Independence: Repairing Citizens
United Becomes a Test for Three GOP Senators, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2010, at
Al5.
37. CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., CORPORATE
CAMPAIGN SPENDING: GIVING SHAREHOLDERS A VOICE 1, 3 (2010).
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United decision, address corporate personhood generally and analyze the
First Amendment with respect to corporations."
However, these commentators either misunderstand or ignore the
fundamental principle of the First Amendment. The First Amendment
protects speech. Period. So long as a speaker is able to engage in speech,
the First Amendment ensures that speech is protected in the absence of a
sufficiently important government interest to justify infringing the
speaker's speech rights. As one case noted, "The First Amendment 'has
its fullest and most urgent application' to speech uttered during a
campaign for political office."3 Yet again, the Court affirms that it is the
speech that is protected. As Citizens United states, "The First
Amendment protects speech and speaker, and the ideas that flow from
each." 4 0 The Court thus reaffirmed "Bellotti's central principle: that the
First Amendment does not allow political speech restrictions based on a
speaker's corporate identity." 4 1
It is upon this background that the Citizens United Court
considered the issue of whether the government's interest was
sufficiently important to justify limiting speech rights of the corporation.
But the Court's analysis is not tied to whether a corporation is a person
or to any particular theory of corporate personhood. Thus, the focus post-
Citizens United should be on the sufficiency of the government interests
advanced to support campaign finance laws, which infringe First
Amendment activity, rather than on who is engaging in First Amendment
activity.
38. See, e.g., Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations
and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577 (1990). See also Rubin, supra note 11.
39. Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223
(1989) (emphasis added) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272
(1971)).
40. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558. U.S. , 130 S. Ct.
876, 899 (2010).
41. Id. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 903.
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II. FROM PERSON TO PERSONA NON GRATA: THE TREATMENT OF
CORPORATIONS UNDER CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW FROM BELLOTI TO
MCCONNELL.
In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,42 the Supreme Court
held that the First Amendment protects speech and speaker, regardless of
whether the speaker is an individual or a corporation, and that there was
nothing dangerous about the corporate form to warrant limiting corporate
speech and association. Subsequently, however, the Court suggested in
dicta in Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life,
43Inc. that it was appropriate to restrict corporate political speech in ways
that would be inappropriate if applied to human persons' speech. And in
three subsequent decisions, the Court whittled away corporate free
speech protections until corporations were left with no right to engage in
their own political speech whatsoever. In the first of these, Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce,44 the Court held that the corporate
form provided a compelling government interest to support banning
general-fund independent expenditures in support of, or in opposition to,
candidates. In the second, Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont,45
the Court held that corporations can also be banned from making
general-fund contributions to candidates. And in the third, McConnell v.
46Federal Election Commission, the Court held that corporations may be
banned from making general-fund electioneering communications.
A. Bellotti held that the First Amendment protects speech, regardless of
the speaker.
In the November 1976 general election, Massachusetts voters
were asked to approve a proposed amendment to their state constitution
that would permit the state legislature to impose a graduated income
42. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). See infra Section II.A.
43. 479 U.S. 238 (1986). See infra Section II.B.
44. 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). See infra Section II.C.
45. 539 U.S. 146 (2003). See infra at Section II.D.
46. 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. , 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). See infra Section II.E.
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tax. 47 Two banks and three corporations - First National Bank of
Boston, New England Merchants National Bank, The Gillette Company,
Digital Equipment Corporation, and Wyman-Gordon Company -
believed that if a graduated income tax were instituted, their business
48interests would be negatively impacted. They decided to spend money
on advertisements to explain to the electorate why they opposed the
proposed amendment.4 9 Massachusetts law, however, prohibited banks
and corporations from making contributions or expenditures to publicize
their views on ballot questions unless the question materially affected
their "property, business or assets."50 The law further stated that "[n]o
question submitted to the voters solely concerning the taxation of the
income, property or transactions of individuals shall be deemed
materially to affect the property, business, or assets of the corporation.""
1. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court wrongly decided that
corporations have only limited First Amendment rights.
When the Massachusetts attorney general notified the banks and
corporations that he would enforce the law against them if they carried
52
out their planned advertisements, they sought a declaratory judgment
47. First Nat'1 Bank of Boston v. Att'y Gen., 359 N.E.2d 1262, 1265
(Mass. 1977), overruled by Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765.
48. Att'y Gen., 359 N.E.2d at 1266. Specifically, the banks and
corporations asserted that the adoption of the amendment would have the effect of:
discouraging highly qualified executives and highly skilled
professional personnel from settling, working or remaining in
Massachusetts; promoting a tax climate which would be
considered unfavorable by business corporations, thereby
discouraging them from settling in Massachusetts with 'resultant
adverse effects' on the plaintiff banks' loans, deposits, and other
services; and tending to shrink the disposable income of
individuals available for the purchase of the consumer products
manufactured by at least one of the plaintiff corporations.
Id.
49. Id. at 1262, 1262 n.1, 1265.
50. Id. at 1266.
51. Id. at 1265 n.4 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 55, § 8) (West
1975)).
52. The law contained stiff penalties for corporations violating it:
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that the prohibition on their political spending was unconstitutional.53
Among other causes of action, First National Bank and the other
plaintiffs asserted that the prohibition on their political spending violated
First Amendment free speech guarantees, both facially and as applied to
them.54 Because of the pendency of the coming election, the case was
heard on an expedited basis by the Supreme Judicial Court,"
Massachusetts' highest court,5 6 which ruled that the challenged statute
was constitutional.
The court's First Amendment analysis began with the question
of whether corporate persons have First Amendment rights coextensive
with those of natural persons.58 It concluded that they do not.59 Rather,
the court found that corporations possessed only those speech rights
necessary to protect their property and business concerns.60 The court
held that "only when a general political issue materially affects a
corporation's business, property or assets may that corporation claim
First Amendment protection for its speech or other activities entitling it
corporations found guilty would be subject to a fine of not more
than fifty thousand dollars, and the person who authorized the
corporate transaction would face a fine of not more than ten
thousand dollars and a year imprisonment. Furthermore, anyone
who "in any way knowingly aids or abets the violation of any
provision" of the law faced the same penalty as the person who
authorized the corporate transaction.
Id.
53. Id. at 1265.
54. Id. at 1268. The court noted that "[i]n essence, [the plaintiffs] assume
a corporate right to free speech under both the Federal and State Constitutions and
also assume that a prohibition of the expenditure of corporate funds impermissibly
precludes the exercise of that right." Id. at 1269.
5 5. Id.
56. See The Massachusetts Court System, http://www.mass.gov
/courts/courtsandjudges/courts/structurecolor.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2010).
57. Att'y Gen., 359 N.E.2d at 1265 n.6.
58. Id. at 1269.
59. Id. at 1270.
60. Id. The court arrived at this conclusion from its recognition that
corporations have Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process rights,
and their business and financial interests are protected by those rights. Corporations
must therefore be entitled to speak on issues affecting their property, business, and
finances. Id.
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to communicate its position on that issue to the general public."6 Thus,
the court concluded that the law banning corporations from speaking on
issues that did not affect their business or assets was not facially
62
unconstitutional. Because the court concluded that there could have
been a rational basis to support the legislature's decree that ballot
questions concerning taxation did not affect the business interests of
63
corporations and banks, and because the corporations had not made the
requisite showing that their interests would be affected by the proposed
amendment,64 the law was not unconstitutional as applied to these
plaintiffs in the context of a ballot question about graduated income
taxation.6 5
2. The United States Supreme Court held that speech may not be
regulated simply because the speaker is a corporation.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had framed the
question presented in Bellotti as "whether business corporations . . .
have First Amendment rights coextensive with those of natural
persons" and concluded that they did not. On appeal, however, the
United States Supreme Court said that the Massachusetts court asked the
68
wrong question. The question is not whether corporations have First
Amendment rights and whether they are coextensive with the rights of
69individuals. Rather, the proper question is whether the challenged law
"abridges expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect.""o
The Court rejected the arguments that would have limited corporate
speech protection to something less than that enjoyed by individuals'
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1271 (discussing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 55, § 8) (West
1975)).
64. Id
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1269.
67. Id. at 1270.
68. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978).
69. Id.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
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speech, 7 1 ruling instead that speech that would otherwise be unregulable
cannot be regulated on the basis of the corporate identity of the
72
speaker. There is "practically universal agreement," the Court
explained, that the First Amendment was crafted by the Founders "to
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs." 7 3 In other words, the
First Amendment protects speech, no matter who the speaker is.
From that beginning proposition, the Court's analysis was
straightforward: the corporations' proposed speech was political speech,
which lies at the core of the First Amendment's protections.7 4 Had
natural persons wanted to engage in such speech, rather than
corporations, "no one would suggest that the State could silence their
proposed speech." 7 5 The value of political speech is not diminished by
the corporate identity of the speakers; thus, the fact that the speaker was
a corporate person rather than a natural one was of no importance to the
constitutional analysis. 6 Rather, "[t]he inherent worth of the speech in
terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the
identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or
individual."77 The State is therefore prohibited from allowing people to
speak, while banning corporations from doing the same,78 because
government is "constitutionally disqualified from dictating the subjects
about which persons may speak and the speakers who may address a
public issue."79 The First Amendment, after all, protects speech.80
71. Id. at 781-83 (rejecting the theories that only corporations engaged in
the communications business, such as the press, enjoy First Amendment protection
and that corporate speech is only protected when it furthers the business interests of
the corporation).
72. Id. at 784.
73. Id. at 776-77 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
74. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776.
75. Id. at 777.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. The Court recognized that its jurisprudence included decisions
upholding limits on corporate speech, but explained that "there is no suggestion that
the reason was because a corporation rather than an individual or association was
involved." Bellotti, Id. at 778 n.14.
79. Id. at 785-86 (citing Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96
(1972)).
80. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776.
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Because the ban on corporate speech could not survive the applicable
81. 82
scrutiny, it was unconstitutional.
Following closely on the heels of Bellotti, Consolidated Edison
Co. v. Public Service Commission of New York83 invalidated a ban on
corporations using their billing envelopes to express their views to
consumers. A utility company wanted to distribute pro-nuclear power
literature with its billing statements.84 The state public service
commission forbade it from doing so, and the New York Court of
Appeals ultimately upheld the ban. The Supreme Court, however, ruled
in the utility's favor, citing Bellotti for the proposition that the First
Amendment protects speech, regardless of the fact that the speaker is a
.88
corporation.
In 1986, the Supreme Court decided Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
v. Public Utilities Commission,8 9 which concerned the question of
whether corporate utilities using their billing envelopes to communicate
their speech could be required by the utilities commission to include
counter-speech from their opponents. 90 The Court ruled that "[t]here
[was] no doubt" that under the principles announced in Bellotti, and other
cases, the utility company's speech "receives the full protection of the
First Amendment." 9 1 The Court then analyzed whether it was permissible
81. The Court subjected the corporate speech ban to "the exacting scrutiny
necessitated by a state-imposed restriction of freedom of speech," requiring the State
to demonstrate that its interest in the law was "compelling" and that the law was
"closely drawn" to that interest. Id. at 786. The State asserted two interests in its
attempt to justify the corporate speech ban: "sustaining the active role of the
individual citizen in the electoral process and thereby preventing diminution of the
citizen's confidence in government" and "protecting the rights of shareholders
whose views differ from those expressed by management on behalf of the
corporation." Id at 787. Each interest failed scrutiny. Id. at 787-95.
82. Id. at 795.
83. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
84. Id. at 532.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 533 (citing Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 47
N.Y.2d 94 (N.Y. 1979)).
87. Consol. Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 544.
88. See id at 540 (supporting this point).
89. 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
90. Id. at 4-7.
91. Id. at 8.
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to compel corporations to alter their speech by including counter-speech
that they did not want to make.92 In determining that the State may not
compel corporate speech any more than it can compel the speech of
individuals,9 3 the Court recognized that compelled corporate speech
"impermissibly burdens . . . [the appellant corporation's] own
expression" 94 and "impermissibly requires appellant to associate with
speech with which appellant may disagree., The Court ruled the
compelled speech unconstitutional. 96
After Bellotti, Consolidated Edison, and Pacific Gas, it appeared
settled that there was no danger inherent in the corporate form that could
justify infringing corporate speech in ways that would be impermissible
if the speaker were a person. However, Federal Election Commission v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL)98 soon suggested
otherwise. Decided just ten months after Pacifc Gas, MCFL suggested
in dicta that corporate political speech was potentially dangerous and
could be restricted in ways human speech could not be. 9 9
92. Id. at 9-12.
93. Id. at 16 (citation omitted) ("For corporations as for individuals, the
choice to speak includes within it the choice of what not to say.").
94. Id. at 13 (citation omitted).
95. Id. at 15.
96. Id. at 20-21.
97. Federal Election Commission v. National Right to Work Comm., 459
U.S. 197 (1982), is not contrary to this position. In National Right to Work, the
Court upheld the federal ban on soliciting non-member contributions for corporate
PACs. 459 U.S. at 201-02, 208-09. At least one commentator has suggested that, in
doing so, the Court affirmed the constitutionality of the federal requirement that
corporations - but not individuals - employ a PAC to engage in certain political
speech. Robert E. Mutch, Before and After Bellotti: The Corporate Political
Contributions Cases, 5 ELECTION L.J. 293, 313 (2006). This, however, overlooks the
fact that the constitutionality of the PAC-requirement was not before the Court.
Rather, the Court was only asked to decide whether the corporation had engaged in
illegal "solicitation of funds." Nat'1 Right to Work, 459 U.S. at 198. Thus, National
Right to Work did not involve questions concerning corporate speech but only
questions concerning from whom corporations could solicit money for their PACs'
speech.
98. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
99. See id at 257.
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B. MCFL suggested that restrictions targeting corporate political
speech might be constitutional.
MCFL involved a challenge by Massachusetts Citizens for Life,
an ideological membership corporation, to the constitutionality of section
316 of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA),"o which prohibits
corporations from using general fund dollars for expenditures "'in
connection with' federal candidate elections. 0' Instead, the statute
requires corporations to employ "separated segregated funds," or PACs,
to make their expenditures.102 In spite of this requirement, MCFL used
general-fund money'o3 to publish a newsletter in which it encouraged
readers to "vote 'pro-life', 10 4 and identified candidates whose positions it
judged to be consistent with its pro-life views. o
The Federal Election Commission filed a complaint in district
court, alleging that MCFL had violated the prohibition on corporate
general fund political expenditures. 106 The district court granted MCFL's
motion for summary judgment,107 ruling that (1) the publication was not
an "expenditure" within the meaning of the statute; 08 (2) the publication
100. Codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006).
101. Mass. Citizensfor Life, 479 U.S. at 241.
102. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C)(102). "Separate segregated funds" and
"political committees," commonly called "PACs," are synonymous terms. Under
federal law, a political action committee (PAC) includes "any separate segregated
fund established under the provisions of section 441b(b) of this title." 2 U.S.C. §
431(4)(B) (2006). Section 44lb(b) provides for a PAC where it maintains "the
establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions to a separate
segregated fund . . . for political purposes by a corporation." 2 U.S.C. §
441b(b)(2)(C). See also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. _,
, 130 S. Ct. 876, 887 (2010) (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)) (under 2 U.S.C. §
441b(b)(2), corporations "may establish ... a 'separate segregated fund' (known as a
political action committee, or PAC)"); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life,
551 U.S. 449, 485 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("a separate segregated fund" is
"commonly known as a 'PAC"'); Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 254 (stating
that "a 'separate segregated fund'" has been understood as "a 'political committee").
103. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 244.
104. Id. at 243.
105. Id. at 243-44.
106. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 589 F. Supp. 646,
647 (D. Mass. 1984).
107. Id. at 653.
108. Id. at 649 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)).
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was exempt from FECA's ban;109 and (3) if the statute applied to MCFL
and its newsletter, it was "unconstitutional under the First
Amendment." 110 On appeal, the First Circuit held that the statute as
applied was unconstitutional.' 1  After granting certiorari, the Supreme
Court noted two questions: (1) whether MCFL's general fund publication
of the newsletter had violated 2 U.S.C. § 441b; and if so, (2) whether that
statute may constitutionally be applied to MCFL and its conduct.11
Finding the newsletter violated the ban on corporate general fund
independent expenditures for political speech purposes,'l3 the Court
114
considered whether the statute was constitutional as applied to MCFL,
a nonprofit corporation that sought to promote its "right to life" message
through political and other activities.' Because the ban on corporate
general fund expenditures burdened speech,116 the Court required the
government to justify the ban with a compelling interest. The Federal
Election Commission's proffered interest combined concerns about
corruption, fairness, and shareholder protection. Because of "'the special
characteristics of the corporate structure,""' 8 the Court acknowledged
that corporations may amass capital in the economic marketplace that
can have a "corrosive influence" and lead to an "unfair advantage" for
109. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 589 F. Supp. at 650.
110. Id. at 651.
111. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 241
(1986).
112. Mass. Citizensfor Life, 479 U.S. at 241.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 241-42.
116. Id. at 255. The Court recognized that PACs are "burdensome," id.,
and "substantial" restrictions on corporate speech, id. at 252. Corporations are not
allowed to use their own money to fund their PACs. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006). See
also Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 252 (explaining that "the corporation is not
free to use its general funds for campaign advocacy purposes."). Rather, corporations
may secure funding for their PACs only from their "stockholders and their families
and its executive or administrative personnel and their families." 2 U.S.C. §
441b(b)(4)(A)(i). See also Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm.,
459 U.S. 197 (1982) (upholding a federal ban on soliciting non-member
contributions for corporate PACs). Non-stock, membership corporations can secure
funding from their members. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4)(C).
117. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 256.
118. Id. (quoting Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. at 209-10).
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corporate speech.19 The ban on corporate general fund expenditures for
political speech, and the corresponding requirement that corporations
employ segregated funds for their political speech, was designed to
ensure that a corporation's political spending reflect popular support for
-120its political positions.
The MCFL Court ruled that the Federal Election Commission's
proffered interest could not apply to MCFL, which did not participate in
the economic marketplace and whose sole source of income was its
members' contributions and the various fundraisers it held.12 1 MCFL was
(1) "formed for the express purpose of promoting political ideas, and
cannot engage in business activities"; (2) had "no shareholders or other
persons affiliated so as to have a claim on its assets or earnings" and
thus, "persons connected with the organization will have no economic
disincentive for disassociating with it if they disagree with its political
activity"; and (3) "was not established by a business corporation or a
labor union" and did not "accept contributions from such entities."l 22
The Federal Election Commission's alleged dangers inherent in
corporate speech had no application to MCFL and groups like it, which
were "formed to disseminate political ideas, not to amass capital."I23 The
ban on general fund corporate political speech was therefore
124
unconstitutional as applied to MCFL.
MCFL only challenged the law as it applied to them,125 so the
Court did not reach the question of whether section 441b could
constitutionally be applied to other types of corporations. However, in
dicta the Court suggested it would have upheld section 441b's ban on
corporate general fund expenditures against a facial challenge. It referred
to the nonprofit, non-stockm, and non-business characteristics of MCFL
as "essential" to its holding.126 It suggested that because business
corporations have "legal advantages enhancing their ability to
accumulate wealth," Congress was justified in restricting their
119. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 257.
120. Id. at 258.
121. Id. at 242.
122. Id. at 264.
123. Id. at 259.
124. Id. at 263.
125. Id. at 241.
126. Id at 263-64.
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spending.12 Otherwise, they might use capital amassed in the economic
marketplace to achieve an "unfair advantage" for their political
speech.12 And it suggested that section 441b's regulations of corporate
speech were proper.129
1. MCFL was a carve-out exemption to an unconstitutional law.
Although the MCFL Court was correct in holding that section
441b's ban on corporate independent expenditures could not
constitutionally be applied to MCFL, its analysis was deeply flawed.
First and most obviously, MCFL's rule was a carve-out exemption to a
ban on speech that, under binding Supreme Court precedent, should have
been struck as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court in Buckley
previously held that spending limits are unconstitutional. 130 The only
interest that could undergird infringing First Amendment political speech
and association was the interest in curbing quid pro quo financial
corruption,131 and the Buckley Court ruled that expenditures made
independently of candidates were non-corrupting.132 The Court further
stated: "While the independent expenditure ceiling thus fails to serve any
substantial governmental interest in stemming the reality of appearance
of corruption in the electoral process, it heavily burdens core First
Amendment expression."133 Since there was no interest to support
expenditure limits,134 the Buckley Court held that expenditure limits
failed constitutional scrutiny.' 35 The government may not, therefore,
constitutionally impose limits on independent expenditures.136
Section 441b, at issue in MCFL, was not a limit on expenditures,
such as was at issue in Buckley. Rather, it was a ban on expenditures.
127. Id. at 258 n.11.
128. Id. at 257.
129. Id. at 258 ("By requiring that corporate independent expenditures be
financed through a political committee expressly established to engage in campaign
spending, § 441b seeks to prevent this threat to the political marketplace.").
130. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51 (1976).
131. Id. at 26-28.
132. Id. at 45-47.
133. Id. at 47-48.
134. Id. at 45.
135. Id. at 51.
136. Id.
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The Court acknowledged that fact when it recognized that section 441b
"was meant to proscribe expenditures in connection with an election"13 7
and referred to it as a "prohibition."' 38 Although the MCFL Court
suggested that section 441b was not "an absolute restriction on speech"
because it allowed corporations to employ PACs to speak for them,
corporations were still prohibited from using their general treasury funds
to engage in political speech. Further, the very act of employing a
PAC forced corporations to submit to PAC-burdens,140 which the Court
described as "extensive requirements" and "stringent restrictions."l41 As
a ban on independent expenditures, section 441b should have been held
unconstitutional under Buckley, which held that limits on independent
expenditures - even without the associated PAC-burdens - fail to pass
constitutional scrutiny. Surely, bans on independent expenditures
coupled with PAC-burdens must fail to pass scrutiny as well.
Instead, the MCFL Court failed to even consider Buckley's rule.
Without any evidence at all, the Court's dicta accepted the Federal
Election Commission's contention that corporate wealth, earned in the
marketplace, might corrupt elections. 142 The Court recognized, however,
that non-profit advocacy corporations like MCFL do not present a
corruption risk because they are not organized to make money in the
marketplace.143 The Court therefore concluded that section 44 1b's ban on
corporate general-fund independent expenditures was unconstitutional as
applied to MCFL. 14 4
Had the MCFL Court applied Buckley's rule that government
may not constitutionally limit independent expenditures, it would have
held section 441b's ban unconstitutional, without consideration of what
type of corporation MCFL was and whether its participation in the
political marketplace somehow might be corrupting. If government may
137. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 246
(1986).
138. Id. at 247.
139. Id. at 252.
140. Id. at 252-54.
141. Id. at 254.
142. Id. at 258.
143. Id. at 259.
144. Id. at 263.
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not ban independent expenditures by people - and it cannot 45
government may not ban independent expenditures by corporations
either.
The MCFL Court did not address these rules from Buckley and
Bellotti. Instead, the MCFL Court created a carve-out exemption to an
unconstitutional law. It left section 441b's ban on corporate independent
expenditures intact but created an exception for so-called "MCFL
corporations." And it expressed in dicta that corporate independent
expenditures might somehow corrupt the political process, thereby
creating a justification for restricting corporate speech. As Citizens
146
United would subsequently explain, the MCFL Court was wrong.
2. MCFL was a tacit approval of censoring speech of disfavored
speakers.
Section 441b's ban on independent expenditures, by its terms,
only applied to corporations, national banks, and labor organizations. It
did not apply to individuals. 14 7 Thus, it was a speech restriction based not
on speech but rather on the identity of the speaker. Such restrictions are
unconstitutional. 14 As the Bellotti Court noted: "In the realm of
protected speech, the legislature is constitutionally disqualified from
dictating the subjects about which persons may speak and the speakers
who may address a public issue."l49
145. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51 (1976).
146. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S.
130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010) (ruling that "independent expenditures, including those
made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of
corruption").
147. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006).
148. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 899 (noting that
"[a]t least before Austin, the Court had not allowed the exclusion of a class of
speakers from the general public dialogue").
149. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-85 (1978).
See also Citizens United, 558 U.S. at ,130 S. Ct. at 898 (noting that restrictions
that distinguish among speakers by letting some speak, but not others, are
constitutionally prohibited); Police Dept. of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)
(explaining that the Constitution does not allow "discrimination among different
users of the same medium for expression").
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Dicta in MCFL, however, implied that it accepted the
government's contention that corporate wealth amassed in the economic
marketplace might be used to achieve an "unfair advantage in the
political marketplace.,"' Tellingly, neither the government nor the Court
expressed concern that individuals who amass wealth in the economic
marketplace might likewise achieve an unfair political advantage. Rather,
it was only the corporate person's speech that was targeted as potentially
corrupting. Wealthy individuals could spend without limit and without
corrupting the political process, but section 441b banned wealthy
corporate persons from spending at all. The Court's implied acceptance
*of this regime amounted to a tacit approval of the government censoring
disfavored speakers' speech.
MCFL's dicta thus signaled a drastic turn from Bellotti's rule
that the First Amendment protects speech, irrespective of who the
speaker is, without any explanation of how such a change could be
constitutionally permitted.' This paved the way for Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce,152 which adopted MCFL's dicta and subverted
Bellotti's rule that the State may not silence speech made by corporate
persons if it could not silence speech made by natural persons. Austin
150. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,
257-58 (1986).
151. See Prescott M. Lassman, Breaching the Fortress Walls: Corporate
Political Speech and Note, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 78 VA. L.
REv. 759, 772 (1992) (noting that "[r]ather than painting with bold strokes, thereby
making it unlikely that any expenditure restriction could survive First Amendment
scrutiny, the [MCFL] Court appeared willing both to make fine distinctions and to
consider the special characteristics of corporations and their potential effect on the
political process").
152. 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
153. See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory
of Protected Communications by Organizations, Communities, and the State, 79
CAL. L. REV. 1229, 1230 (1991) (calling Austin a "step in a direction opposite" from
Bellotti); Lassman, supra note 151, at 759 (arguing that Austin "altered the
boundaries of First Amendment protection of corporate political speech"); Edward
G. Reitler, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce: Re-examining Corporate
Political Rights under the First Amendment, 11 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 449, 452,
474 (1991) (calling Austin a "retreat" from Bellotti and a "welcomed first step" in
withdrawing First Amendment protection from corporations); John S. Shockley &
David A. Schultz, The Political Philosophy of Campaign Finance Reform as
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held that for-profit corporations may be prohibited from engaging in
spending for political speechl54 even though it would be unconstitutional
to prohibit individuals from doing likewise."'
C. Austin held that the government may ban corporate independent
expenditures because they are made by corporations.
At issue in Austin was a Michigan statute that, like the federal
statute at issue in MCFL, prohibited corporations from using general
treasury funds to make their independent expendituresl5 and required
them instead to employ a PAC.15 7 The Michigan Chamber of Commerce
challenged the law because it wanted to make a general treasury
independent expenditure in support of a candidate during a special
election for a Michigan House of Representatives vacancy. The district
court concluded the statute was constitutional because it allowed
corporations to employ PACs to engage in political speech. 59 The court
reasoned that the legislature struck the proper balance between the right
of corporations to engage in political speech and the state interest in
preventing "actual or perceived alliances between corporate power and
political candidates."160 It did not matter to the court that there had never
been a finding of actual corruption; the threat was enough.161 Nor did it
matter that Buckley had ruled independent expenditures could not be
constitutionally limited, or that Bellotti had ruled that the First
Articulated in the Dissents in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 24 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 165, 166 (1992) (explaining that "[t]he [Austin] decision ... surprised
constitutional scholars because earlier cases could have been used to strike down the
Michigan law").
154. Austin, 494 U.S. at 654-55.
155. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39-51 (1976).
156. Austin, 494 U.S. at 654.
157. Id. at 669 (noting that "segregated funds" and "political action
committees," or "PACs," are synonymous terms) (Brennan, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 656 (majority opinion).
159. Mich. Chamber of Commerce v. Austin, 643 F. Supp. 397, 404
(W.D. Mich. 1986), rev'd, 856 F.2d 783 (6th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
160. Id.
16 1. Id.
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 9278
CITIZENS UNITED
Amendment protects speech, regardless of who the speaker is. The
district court said that the law passed scrutiny and was constitutional.162
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.163 It recognized
that "indirect expenditures made by a nontraditional corporation, like the
Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, formed for essentially
ideological purposes and to disseminate economic and political ideas and
not to amass capital, do not pose the threat or appearance of
corruption."1' Without the threat of corruption, there could be no
interest in preventing the Chamber's independent expenditures; thus, the
law was unconstitutional as applied to it.
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit.166 Whereas
Bellotti held that corporate speech cannot be restricted simply because
the speaker is a corporation,167 Austin said that corporations were
sufficiently different from individuals that corporate speech could be
infringed in ways that individuals' speech cannot. Adopting MCFL's
dicta,168 the Court reasoned that corporations receive numerous "special
advantages" under state law, which allow them to use "'resources
amassed in the economic marketplace' to obtain 'an unfair advantage in
the political marketplace."'" 70 Corporations could thus "unfairly
influence elections" if they were allowed to fund political speech with
their wealth.'71 The Court ruled that the interest in preventing the
162. Id.
163. Mich. Chamber of Commerce v. Austin, 856 F.2d 783 (6th Cir.
1988), rev'd, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
164. Id. at 784.
165. Id.
166. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 669 (1990),
overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010).
167. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978).
168. Austin, 494 U.S. at 664, 670 (accepting MCFL's dicta that "state-
conferred advantages" give corporations "'an unfair advantage in the political
marketplace"' and that the nonprofit, non-stock, non-business characteristics of
MCFL "were 'essential"' to MCFL's holding) (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v.
Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. 479 U.S. 238, 263 (1986)).
169. The Court identified the "special advantages" as "limited liability,
perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of
assets." Id. at 658-59.
170. Id. at 659 (quoting Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 257).
171. Id. at 660.
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"corrosive and distorting effects" of corporate political speech was
compelling.172 Thus, the Court identified a new antidistortion interest
inherent in the corporate form.
Prior to Austin, the only interest the Court had ever recognized as
important enough to justify limiting political speech was the
anticorruption interest, 7 3 and the only type of corruption the Court had
ever recognized as implicating that interest was financial quid pro quo
corruption or its appearance.174 Even then, the anticorruption interest
only justified limits on contributions to candidatesl 7 5 or to PACs that
make contributions to candidates, 7 6  because "large campaign
contributions" were the one area of First Amendment activity "where the
actuality and potential for corruption have been identified."' 77 Buckley
emphatically ruled that the anticorruption interest did not support laws
that limited expenditures, 7 8 and the Court had previously explicitly
rejected the anticorruption interest as inadequate to justify expenditure
limits in both Buckley 7 9 and Federal Election Commission v. National
172. Id.
173. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-28 (1976). See also Citizens
Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1981) (explaining that
"Buckley identified a single narrow exception to the rule that limits on political
activity were contrary to the First Amendment," which was the interest in preventing
corruption).
174. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197,
208-10 (1982); Cal. Med. Ass'n v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 197-98
(1981); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27; Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative
Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985) (explaining that the type of
corruption the anticorruption interest was designed to curb was "dollars for political
favors").
175. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27.
176. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. at 208-10; Cal. Med. Ass'n,
453 U.S. at 197-98.
177. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28. See also First Nat'l Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978) (recognizing that the anticorruption interest was
only implicated in candidate elections).
178. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45.
179. Id. (finding the anticorruption interest inadequate to justify
restrictions on independent expenditures); id. at 52 (finding the anticorruption
interest inadequate to justify restrictions on expenditures by candidates from their
personal or family resources); id. at 55-56 (finding the anticorruption interest
inadequate to justify restrictions on campaign expenditures).
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Conservative Political Action Committee. 1o In fact, prior to Austin, the
Court had never upheld direct restrictions on independent
expenditures. 8  No wonder Justice Scalia described Austin as "a
significant departure from ancient First Amendment principles." 8 2
Under Buckley's holding that independent expenditures may not be
limited, and Bellotti's holding that corporate speech may not be restricted
simply because the speaker is a corporation, the Austin Court should
have found Michigan's ban on corporate independent expenditures
unconstitutional.
Sidestepping the issue of whether the interest in preventing quid
pro quo corruption was sufficient to support Michigan's ban on general-
fund corporate independent expenditures,183 the Austin Court "bypass[ed]
Buckley and Bellotti"l84 and identified an antidistortion interest 85 served
by limiting corporate-funded political speech. It unconvincingly called
the perceived "distorting effects" of corporate money "a different type of
corruption,"l86 probably in an attempt to cast the antidistortion interest
within Buckley's anticorruption interest framework.1 87 Buckley, though,
had not posited a general anticorruption interest, but a specific one;
namely, the interest in preventing financial, quid pro quo corruption or
its appearance. Such quid pro quo corruption was the sum total of the
anticorruption interest,189 not "a narrow subspecies of a hitherto
180. 470 U.S. 480, 498 (1985).
181. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 695 (1990)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n,
558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
182. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 490
(2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part & concurring in judgment).
183. Austin, 494 U.S. at 659-60.
184. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. , , 130 S.
Ct. 876, 903 (2010).
185. This is Citizens Uniteds term. Id. The Austin Court referred to it as
an interest in curbing "a different type of corruption," Austin, 494 U.S. at 660,
probably in an attempt to cast the interest within Buckley's anticorruption interest
framework. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-28 (1976).
186. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
187. Justice Scalia, in dissent, facetiously termed this "the 'New
Corruption."' Austin, 494 U.S. at 652 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
188. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27.
189. Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 296-97
(1981).
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unrecognized genus of political corruption."l90 Austin thus misconstrued
Buckley in order to create a rationale for restricting corporate political
speech. Applying strict scrutiny, the Court found that the ban on
corporate general-fund independent expenditures was narrowly tailored
to its newly-adopted and expanded anticorruption interest, which it found
sufficiently compelling.192 The Court therefore held Michigan's ban on
direct corporate independent expenditures was constitutional.' 93
The Court arrived at this holding not because of faithful First
Amendment analysis but rather because of policy concerns. Had it
followed its First Amendment jurisprudence, it would have invalidated
Michigan's law for any of four reasons. The Court could have followed
any of Buckley's holdings - that independent expenditures for political
speech may not be limited,194 speech-equalization rationales are
constitutionally infirm,19 5 and First Amendment freedoms are not
contingent on the wealth of speakers.' 96 Or the Court could have
followed Bellotti's rule that government may not discriminate against
corporate speakers.197 Yet, for policy reasons, the Court followed none of
these rules. It abandoned its previously announced First Amendment
principles leaving corporate political speech unprotected.' 98
1. The corporate speech ban was unconstitutional under Buckley 's rule
that independent expenditures may not be limited.
Buckley recognized expenditure limits, such as were at issue in
Austin, impose "direct and substantial restraints" on the amount of
political speech a speaker is able to make.1 99 To be effective, political
200
speech almost always costs money. One of the limits challenged in
190. Austin, 494 U.S. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 657 (majority opinion).
192. Id. at 660.
193. Id. at 668-69.
194. See infra Section II.C.1.
195. See infra Section II.C.2.
196. See infra Section II.C.3.
197. See infra Section II.C.4.
198. See infra Section II.C.5.
199. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976).
200. Id. at 40 (noting that the Act's $1,000 independent expenditure limit
"would make it a federal criminal offense" for someone to pay for one quarter-page
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Buckley was a $1,000, "drastic" limit on the amount "individuals and
groups" could spend to make independent expenditures. 20 1 The "plain
effect" of this limit was to prohibit individuals and groups - including
202 203
corporations - from expressing their opinions about candidates.
While the Buckley Court recognized that the anticorruption interest was
constitutionally cognizable to justify limits on contributions to
candidates,204 it found the interest insufficient to justify limits on
independent expenditures.205 The Court explained that there is no danger
206
of corruption with independent expenditures, which by definition are
made without coordination with the candidate, 20 because there is no
possibility that they will be given in exchange for a quid pro quo.208
Thus, no corruption interest can justify limiting independent
209
expenditures.
Buckley therefore held that restrictions on independent
expenditures were unconstitutional,2 1 0 and decisions prior to Austin
211
affirmed this rule. Indeed, just two years before Austin the Supreme
Court again declared that "legislative restrictions on advocacy of the
election or defeat of political candidates are wholly at odds with the
political ad in a major city's newspaper); id. at 288 (Marshall, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("One of the points on which all Members of the Court agree
is that money is essential for effective communication in a political campaign.").
201. Id. at 39.
202. Id. at 39 n.45. Earlier in the case, the Supreme Court explained that
"[t]he statute defines 'person' broadly to include "an individual, partnership,
committee, association, corporation, or any other organization or group of persons."
Id. at 23.
203. Id. at 39-40.
204. Id. at 26-29, 33, 45, 47-48.
205. Id. at 45.
206. Id. at 46-47.
207. Id. at 47.
208. Id. ("[I]ndependent expenditures may well provide little assistance to
the candidate's campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive.").
209. Id. at 46-47.
210. Id. at 51.
211. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 498 (1985) (explaining that an anticorruption interest is
inadequate to justify restrictions on expenditures by independent expenditure
committees or "PACs"); Cal. Med. Ass'n v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182,
195 (1981) (explaining that Buckley considered independent expenditures to be
"constitutionally protected").
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guarantees of the First Amendment."212 Had the Austin Court followed
this precedent, it would have held Michigan's ban on corporate general
fund independent expenditures unconstitutional. Instead, Austin created
corruption where Buckley said none existed in order to uphold the ban.213
2. The corporate speech ban was unconstitutional under Buckley's rule
that speech-equalization rationales are constitutionally infirm.
Buckley bluntly stated that "the concept that government may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance
the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment." 2 14
Yet, that is precisely the interest that Michigan advanced and the Court
accepted when it asserted that corporate speech must be silenced because
corporate wealth was distorting the political process by overpowering
215
other speech. Had Austin followed Buckley's rule that speech-
equalization rationales are constitutionally infirm, it would have found
Michigan's ban on corporate independent expenditures unconstitutional.
3. The corporate speech ban was unconstitutional under Buckley's rule
that First Amendment freedoms are not contingent on the wealth of
the speaker.
Similarly, Buckley held that First Amendment freedoms cannot
be contingent on the speaker's wealth.21 Yet, notwithstanding the Austin
212. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 428 (1988) (quoting Buckley, 424
U.S. at 50).
213. Cf. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990),
overruled
by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010) (recognizing that while there is no real danger of quid pro quo corruption
with independent expenditures, distortion and influence are types of corruption),
with Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47 (explaining that the type of corruption the government
has an interest in preventing is quid pro quo corruption). Austin's anti-influence and
antidistortion interests mean that those who engage in speech to influence an
election, or speak so much that they might distort the election through their speech,
are guilty of corruption.
214. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49.
215. Austin, 494 U.S. at 658-60.
216. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49.
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Court's protestation to the contrary,2 17 the law that Austin upheld was
created to silence corporate speakers because they had the potential to
become wealthy. The Court noted that corporations have the "ability to
attract capital." 21 8 This ability created the potential for "wealth" that
219
might distort the political process. Such "wealth" can "unfairly
influence elections."220 Thus, "huge corporate treasuries" are a
"threat." 2 2 1 Even though some corporations "may not have accumulated
significant amounts of wealth," they still have the corporate form and so
they have "the potential" to amass wealth that can be used to "distort[]
the political process."222 Therefore, the state had an interest in banning
their expenditures, just like those of wealthy contributors.223 This
language makes plain that Michigan's ban on corporate speech was
designed to strip corporations of their speech rights because they either
were already wealthy, or else they had the potential to become wealthy.
Such a rationale violated Buckley's rule that First Amendment freedoms
do not depend upon a speaker's wealth. Therefore, the Austin Court
should have found the ban on corporate independent expenditures
unconstitutional.
4. The corporate speech ban was unconstitutional under Bellotti's rule
that government may not discriminate against corporate speakers.
Had the Supreme Court followed Bellotti, it would have held
Michigan's ban on corporate general fund independent expenditures
unconstitutional. The ban treated corporate speakers differently than
natural ones, requiring corporate speakers to employ PACs to speak
while allowing natural speakers to speak for themselves. Bellotti ruled
that because the First Amendment protects speech, such disparate
224
treatment of speakers is unconstitutional. Prior to Austin, the Supreme
217. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
218. Id. at 659.
219. Id. at 660.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 669.
222. Id. at 661.
223. Id.
224. See First Nat'1 Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 78-185
(1977) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (holding that "the legislature is
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Court had never held it permissible to ban political speech based on the
corporate identity of the speaker.225 Bellotti's requirement that
government treat corporate speakers as it treats natural speakers
forecloses that possibility and should have led the Supreme Court to
invalidate Michigan's ban. As the Bellotti Court recognized, when the
Constitution proscribes banning the speech of natural persons, it must
also proscribe banning the speech of corporate ones. 22 6 Michigan's
disparate treatment of corporate and natural persons' speech was "the
rawest form of censorship" because it "censors what a particular segment
of the political community might say with regard to candidates who
stand for election."227
5. The Austin court abandoned its First Amendment precedent because
of policy concerns.
Many commentators have recognized that Austin deviated from
228precedent. Instead, the Austin Court announced a new and contrary
constitutionally disqualified from dictating the subjects about which persons may
speak and the speakers who may address a public issue").
225. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. , , 130 S.
Ct. 876, 903 (2010).
226. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777 (recognizing that the challenged
corporate ban on speech must fall because if natural persons wanted to engage in the
speech at issue before the Court, "no one would suggest that the State could silence
their proposed speech").
227. Austin, 494 U.S. at 700 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
228. See generally Miriam Cytryn, Comment, Defining the Specter of
Corruption: Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 57 BROOK. L. REV.
903 (1991) (explaining that Austin's finding of an anticorruption interest to support
the corporate speech ban relied upon a definition of "corruption" that was at variance
with Supreme Court jurisprudence); Lassman, supra note 151 (arguing that Austin
was an appropriate contradiction and repudiation of prior precedent); Michael
Schofield, Note, Muzzling Corporations: The Court Giveth and the Court Taketh
Away a Corporation's "Fundamental Right" to Free Political Speech in Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 52 LA. L. REV. 253 (1991) (arguing that Austin
departed dramatically from the Court's corporate speech-protective precedent and in
doing so weakened that precedent); Samuel M. Taylor, Note, Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce: Addressing a "New Corruption" in Campaign Financing,
69 N.C. L. REV. 1060 (1991) (articulating that the decision allowing regulation on
the basis of a speaker's wealth and corporate form was a significant departure from
prior Supreme Court jurisprudence).
rule: the interest in curbing the influence of corporate wealth on elections
is sufficiently compelling to support laws banning corporate political
speech. 22 9 This reflected the Court's judgment that corporate money in
politics was dangerous because it can distort elections.230 Thus, the
Austin Court insisted that corporate spending for political speech must
231
reflect "actual public support" for the corporate speech.
Strikingly, the Austin Court had no corresponding concern about
the influence of non-corporate money in politics. Nor did the Court insist
that non-corporate spending reflect "actual public support" for the
message. The Court was not bothered by wealthy labor organizations
232
making expenditures for political speech. Nor was the Court troubled
by wealthy individuals making expenditures for political speech. It was
only corporate spending that concerned the Court, leading Justice Scalia
to ask in dissent, "Why is it perfectly all right if advocacy by an
individual billionaire is out of proportion with 'actual public support' for
his positions?" 233
Left unexplained too was why it mattered whether corporate
expenditures reflected public support for the speech. The Court simply
assumed that it did. However, this rule is a dangerous one because the
234First Amendment was not designed to protect only popular speech.
Presumably, such speech does not need protection. Rather, the First
Amendment was designed to protect unpopular speech235 so that it might
229. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 665.
233. Id. at 685 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
234. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(stating that "[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word
or act their faith therein").
235. See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 117 n.10 (1971) (citations
omitted) (instructing that "the First Amendment . .. which, was intended to protect
vigorous, robust, and unpopular speech without a threat of punishment under state
law"); see also, e.g., D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (explaining that "[t]he
First Amendment . . . include[s] exceptions for obscenity, libel, and disclosure of
state secrets but not for the expression of extremely unpopular and wrong-headed
views").
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236
have the opportunity to be heard and gain acceptance. Austin's
decision effectively stripped corporations of the right to persuade the
public of their message's truth. Instead, under Austin's rule corporations
could only engage in political speech if the public already agreed with
their message. As Justice Kennedy noted in dissent, "Those who thought
that the First Amendment exists to protect all points of view in candidate
elections will be disillusioned by the Court's opinion today." 2 3 7
The requirement that corporate speech reflect popular opinion
ran counter to the "profound national commitment" that "debate on
,238
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.' The
Austin Court made no attempt to reconcile its rule that corporate speech
must reflect broad public support with these principles of First
Amendment jurisprudence. Nor did it adequately wrestle with its prior
First Amendment decisions.239 Nor did it explain how the First
Amendment could tolerate a law that let persons speak only if others
agree with them. It simply announced its new rule, supported by its
newly created anticorruption interest.
The impetus for the Austin Court's decision to abandon First
Amendment principles was its desire to counteract what it perceived as
the "unfair advantage" that corporations enjoyed over other, non-
corporate political speakers.240 The Court accepted a law allegedly
designed to "counterbalance" the advantages states bestow upon
corporations.241 But such counterbalancing is impermissible because
restrictions on speech cannot constitutionally be justified by a desire to
242
equalize voices.
The real purpose of Michigan's law, however, was never to
counterbalance voices. It was something far worse. Michigan's law was
designed to silence one particular set of voices, namely, corporate
speakers. The law counterbalanced nothing and did not equalize voices.
Rather, it silenced corporate political speech, while allowing everyone
236. Austin, 494 U.S. at 693 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 700 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
238. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
239. See supra Section II.C.1.
240. Austin, 494 U.S. at 659.
241. Id. at 665.
242. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976). See also supra section
II.C.1 (discussing Buckley).
CITIZENS UNITED
else to continue speaking. That is not counterbalancing, impermissible as
that would be. It is government censorship, which should have been held
impermissible under the First Amendment.
The potential for abuse in such constitutional rulemaking is
frightening. As Justice Scalia noted in dissent, "Under this mode of
analysis, virtually anything the Court deems politically undesirable can
be turned into political corruption - by simply describing its effects as
politically 'corrosive,' which is close enough to 'corruptive' to
qualify."243 The Austin Court, however, was not deterred. Nor was it
persuaded by the First Amendment concerns with Michigan's law
articulated earlier in this Article. It was too troubled by the fact that
business corporations might benefit from their corporate status and
acquire money in the economic marketplace - money that would not
reflect public support for their political positions.244 They might then use
their money to engage in political speech, which might influence and
245
somehow distort elections. Because the Court thought this was bad
policy, it ignored its precedent and crafted its new rule and so abrogated
corporations' right to engage in political speech by making their own
independent expenditures.
D. Beaumont held that the government may ban corporate contributions
because they are made by corporations.
What Austin did to corporate independent expenditures,
Beaumont did to corporate contributions. The Beaumont case involved an
as-applied challenge by North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. (NCRL), some
246
of its officers, and a voter to 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a), which banned
243. Austin, 494 U.S. at 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 660.
245. Id.
246. The statute provides:
It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation
organized by authority of any law of Congress, to make
a contribution or expenditure in connection with any
election to any political office, or in connection with any
primary election or political convention or caucus held
to select candidates for any political office, or for any
corporation whatever, or any labor organization, to
make a contribution or expenditure in connection with
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247 248
corporate general fund independent expenditures and contributions.
The plaintiffs also challenged the exemption to section 441b's ban,
provided by 11 CFR § 114.10,249 as not being broad enough to exempt
210NCRL as the Constitution required. NCRL accepted an "insignificant
amount" of contributions from other corporations, and so it did not
qualify for the exemption.251 NCRL brought suit in federal district court
any election at which presidential and vice presidential
electors or a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate
or Resident Commissioner to, Congress are to be voted
for, or in connection with any primary election or
political convention or caucus held to select candidates
for any of the foregoing offices, or for any candidate,
political committee, or other person knowingly to accept
or receive any contribution prohibited by this section, or
any officer or any director of any corporation or any
national bank or any officer of any labor organization to
consent to any contribution or expenditure by the
corporation, national bank, or labor organization, as the
case may be, prohibited by this section.
2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006).
247. This was the same provision that the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional as applied to independent expenditures by so-called "MCFL
corporations" in Massachusetts Citizens for Life. See supra section I.B.
248. Beaumont v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 137 F. Supp. 2d 648, 650
(E.D.N.C. 2000), aff'd, 278 F.3d 261 (2002), rev'd, 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
249. This provision of the Code of Federal Regulations defines which
corporations qualify for the so-called "MCFL exemption," announced in
Massachusetts Citizens For Life, to Section 441b's ban on corporate expenditures
and contributions. 479 U.S. 238, 263-64 (1986).
250. Id. at 652.
251. Beaumont, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 652. The MCFL-exemption provided
by 11 C.F.R. § 114.10 only applied to an organization if:
(1) its only express purpose is the promotion of
political ideas and it does not engage in business
activities;
(2) it has no shareholders, nor any other persons with
any ownership interest or claim on assets or earnings or
who receives any benefit that makes it a "disincentive for
them to disassociate themselves with the corporation on
the basis of a corporation's position on a political issue",
including credit cards, education, etc.;
(3) it was not established by a business corporation
or labor organization nor does it "directly or indirectly
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alleging that the threat of enforcement of section 441b against it
infringed its First Amendment rights of expression and association and
moved for summary judgment.252
1. The district court held that both the expenditure and contribution
bans were unconstitutional as applied to NCRL.
The district court analyzed the ban on corporate independent
expenditures under the framework provided by an earlier Fourth Circuit
case, North Carolina Right to Life v. Bartlett,25 3 which held a state law
banning corporate independent expenditures unconstitutional as applied
to NCRL.25 The Bartlett Court concluded the exemption announced in
Massachusetts Citizens For Life "was not 'a constitutional test for when
a nonprofit must be exempt,' but 'an application, in three parts, of First
Amendment jurisprudence to the facts in MCFL."' 2 55 The constitutional
256
test was whether a corporation posed a threat to the political process.
Because NCRL was a nonprofit advocacy organization, and corporate
contributions to it were "not of the traditional form," it should qualify for
257
the MCFL exemption. The Bartlett Court therefore held North
Carolina's law unconstitutional because it did not adequately distinguish
between corporations that posed a threat to the political marketplace and
those, like NCRL, that did not.258 Using this analysis,259 the district court
held the ban on corporate independent expenditures unconstitutional as
applied to NCRL.260 Therefore, the exemption provided by 11 C.F.R. §
114.10 was also unconstitutional as applied to NCRL because by not
accept donations of anything of value from business
corporations"; and
(4) it is a non-profit under 26 U.S.C. 501(C)(4).
Id. at 653 (quoting 11 C.F.R. § 114.10).
252. Id at 650.
253. 168 F.3d 705 (4th Cir. 1999).
254. Beaumont, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 652.
255. Id. (quoting Bartlett, 168 F.3d at 714).
256. Beaumont, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 652.
257. Id. (citing Bartlett, 168 F.3d at 714).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 652-53.
260. Id. at 653.
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exempting NCRL, it infringed its constitutional rights without a
261
compelling interest.
Turning to the contribution ban, the district court began by
recognizing Buckley's rule that limits on contributions implicate First
262Amendment speech and associational rights. This was true for
263
corporations like NCRL as well as for individuals. Section 441b's ban
on corporate contributions meant that, if NCRL wanted to make
contributions, it must employ a PAC to make them on its behalf.264 But
MCFL had recognized that PACs were "burdensome" alternatives that
Ic 265
may create a disincentive" to speak. Thus, the requirement that
26
corporations employ a PAC clearly burdened NCRL's speech. The
relevant inquiry, therefore, was whether the government had a sufficient
interest in doing so.267 The court ruled it did not.268 Although the
government might have an interest in limiting contributions from
contributors, including corporations, it had no interest in completely
banning contributions from corporations like NCRL, as section 441b
26921did. Thus, it was unconstitutional as applied to NCRL.270
261. Id. at 655.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 656.
264. Id.
265. Id. (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479
U.S. 238, 254 (1986)).
266. Beaumont, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 656. The Federal Election
Commission argued that the government interest in the corporate ban was in
preventing the conversion of immense corporate wealth into political war chests and
also to protect the interests of those shareholders who might object to their money
being used for particular speech. Id. The court found both interests unpersuasive as
applied to NCRL. Id. at 656-57.
267. Id. at 656.
268. Id.
269. Id at 657. The district court anticipated what Citizens United would
ultimately hold: PACs cannot speak for their connected organizations because they
are separate entities, so requirements that organizations employ PACs to speak are
actually bans on speech. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S.
_ , 130 S. Ct. 876, 897 (2010).
270. Beaumont, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 658. The district court ruled that
section 441b was unconstitutional, at least as applied to NCRL, and ordered the
parties to brief whether the court should declare it facially unconstitutional as well.
Id. The court ultimately declined to enjoin the provisions facially. Beaumont v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 278 F.3d 261, 264 (4th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
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2. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision.
The Federal Election Commission appealed the district court's
271 '272decision, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
Recognizing that MCFL-type corporations were "vital to our democratic
political process,"2 73 the court stated it was "foolhardy" to pretend that
contribution and expenditure bans did not impede the ability of NCRL
and other advocacy corporations to engage in the political speech.274
Relying on their earlier Bartlett decision,275 the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision that section 441b's ban on expenditures was
276
unconstitutional as applied to NCRL. It also affirmed the district
court's ruling that section 441b's ban on contributions was
unconstitutional as applied to NCRL, noting that it could not "sustain a
measure that drains lifeforce from democracy when that measure does
not reflect the public interest that would warrant such a drastic step." 2 77
Because NCRL "present[ed] no risk whatever to the political process,"
the Fourth Circuit held section 441b's expenditure and contribution bans
278
could not constitutionally be applied to NCRL.
3. The Supreme Court reversed, thereby allowing the government's ban
of corporate contributions.
The Federal Election Commission petitioned for certiorari only
as to the Fourth Circuit's ruling that the ban on corporate contributions
279
was unconstitutional as applied to advocacy corporations like NCRL.
The Supreme Court reversed and held a ban on corporate contributions
does not offend the First Amendment.280
271. Beaumont v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 278 F.3d 261, 265 (4th Cir.
2002).
272. Id. at 264.
273. Id at 266.
274. Id. at 267.
275. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705 (4th Cir. 1999). For
analysis of this decision, see supra notes 253-70 and accompanying text.
276. Beaumont, 278 F.3d at 273.
277. Id. at 275.
278. Id. at 277.
279. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 125, 151 (2003).
280. Id. at 149.
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In reaching this decision, the Court claimed that because section
441b left corporations free to establish PACs to make contributions, it
did not actually ban corporate contributions. 2 The Court asserted that
this PAC-option "'permits some participation of . .. corporations in the
federal electoral process,"' and so it was incorrect to assert that section
441b was a "complete ban.',282 The Court then claimed to identify several
supposed interests supporting section 441b's ban. First, quoting Austin's
claim that corporations have state-conferred advantages that may give
them an unfair advantage,283 the Court said there was an anticorruption
interest in restricting the influence of corporate wealth in politics.284
Second, the Court found an interest in protecting dissenting shareholders
from corporations making contributions with which the shareholders
285disagree. Third, the Court identified an interest in preventing the
circumvention of valid contribution limits by individuals funneling
286
additional contributions through corporations. And fourth, the Court
accepted the "'legislative judgment that the special characteristics of the
corporate structure require particularly careful regulation,"' 287 thereby
approving an interest in restricting speech and association for no other
reason than that the First Amendment actor has chosen to assume the
corporate form. Applying "closely drawn" scrutiny,288 the Court reversed
the Fourth Circuit and so upheld the ban.289
281. Id
282. Id. at 162-63 (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Right to Work
Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 201 (1982)).
283. Id. at 154 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652, 658-59 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558
U.S. , 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)).
284. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 154.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 155.
287. Id. at 155 (quoting Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. at 209-10).
288. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162.
289. Id. at 163.
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4. The Supreme Court's Beaumont decision was poorly reasoned and
wrongly decided.
Like Austin before it,290 the Beaumont decision was poorly
reasoned and did not follow Supreme Court precedent. First, it ignored
the fact that the interests in preventing corruption and protecting
dissenting shareholders had already been ruled inapplicable to First
291Amendment activity of non-profit advocacy corporations. Second, it
failed to recognize that the PAC-option had already been rejected as
292inadequate to protect First Amendment interests. Third, it applied the
293
wrong level of scrutiny to the ban on corporate contributions. Finally,
it accepted a popular distrust of corporate contributions as sufficient to
justify banning them, which was wholly at odds with the Court's
constitutional jurisprudence.2 94
a. The interests in preventing corruption and protecting dissenting
shareholders are inapplicable to advocacy corporations' speech.
The MCFL Court explicitly ruled that speech of non-profit
advocacy corporations does not pose a danger of corruption.295 The fact
290. See supra Section II.C. 1 (discussing the poor reasoning of the Austin
decision).
291. See infra Section II.D.4.a.
292. See infra Section II.D.4.b
293. See infra Section II.D.4.c
294. See infra Section II.D.4.d.
295. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,
259 (1986). The Court stated:
Groups such as MCFL, however, do not pose that danger of
corruption. MCFL was formed to disseminate political ideas, not
to amass capital. MCFL was formed to disseminate political
ideas, not to amass capital. The resources it has available are not a
function of its success in the economic marketplace, but its
popularity in the political marketplace. While MCFL may derive
some advantages from its corporate form, those are advantages
that redound to its benefit as a political organization, not as a
profit-making enterprise. In short, MCFL is not the type of
"traditional corporatio[n] organized for economic gain" that has
been the focus of regulation of corporate political activity.
Id. (citation omitted).
that MCFL enjoyed the benefits of the corporate form was
inconsequential. The Court explained: "Regulation of corporate political
activity thus has reflected concern not about use of the corporate form
per se, but about the potential for unfair deployment of wealth for
political purposes."2 96 Advocacy organizations are not organized to make
money in the marketplace, so there is no danger that they will use money
made in the marketplace to gain an "unfair advantage" for their speech,
as the Court worried for-profit corporations might.297 The MCFL Court
held that the risk of corruption is therefore absent from the speech of
298
nonprofit advocacy organizations.
The Beaumont Court stood that rule on its head, stating that
"concern about the corrupting potential underlying the corporate ban
may indeed be implicated by advocacy corporations."2 99 Inexplicably,
the Beaumont Court said that because non-profit advocacy corporations
enjoy the corporate form, they "benefit from significant 'state-created
advantages,' and may well be able to amass substantial 'political war
chests,"300 in spite of MCFL's ruling to the contrary. The Court made no
attempt to distinguish MCFL, probably because it was indistinguishable.
Both involved nearly identical, non-profit advocacy corporations. But
whereas MCFL had ruled that the anticorruption interest could not
support regulation of MCFL's speech, Beaumont ruled it could support
regulation of NCRL's speech.
The Court had also ruled the interest in protecting dissenting
shareholders was inapplicable to non-profit advocacy corporations'
speech. In Bellotti, the Court concluded that shareholders had recourse to
"the procedures of corporate democracy," by which they could decide
whether their corporations should engage in political speech. 301 And in
MCFL, the Court concluded that the interest in protecting shareholders
was insufficient to support restricting speech of advocacy
296. Id.
297. Id. at 257-58.
298. Id at 259.
299. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 159-60 (2003).
300. Id. at 160 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652, 659 (1990) & Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S.
197, 207 (1982)) (citation omitted).
301. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794-95 (1978).
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corporations.302 The Court explained that individuals give money to
advocacy organizations "precisely because they support" the positions
for which the organizations advocate.303 And those contributors who
want greater control over their donations may earmark their contributions
to be used for specific purposes.304 So the interest in protecting
dissenting shareholders could not support limiting advocacy
corporations' speech.305
The Beaumont Court ruled the exact opposite, holding the ban on
corporate contributions was justified by an interest in protecting donors
to advocacy corporations from having their donations used to support
candidates the donors opposed.306 Gone was MCFL's recognition that
those who contribute to advocacy corporations do so precisely because
they agree with the corporations' message, the causes, and campaigns
they support. 3 07 The Beaumont Court asserted the exact opposite - that
some donors who give money to advocacy corporations might find their
money being used to support candidates they do not like. The Court did
not explain how this is more troubling than donors finding their money
used to fund independent expenditures they do not like, which was the
argument the Court rejected in MCFL. The Beaumont Court simply ruled
that it was.
Thus, advocacy corporations judged non-corrupting in MCFL
were suddenly corrupting in Beaumont, and a "protect shareholders"
interest that was declared inapplicable to advocacy corporations in
MCFL suddenly became all-important. Had the Supreme Court followed
MCFL, it would have found the anticorruption and antidistortion interests
insufficient to support section 441b's ban on corporate contributions, at
least as applied to non-profit advocacy corporations like NCRL. Instead,
the Court made a muddled mess of campaign finance law as it applies to
advocacy corporations.
Under current First Amendment jurisprudence, there is thought
to be no danger that advocacy corporations will convert corporate
302. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 260-
61(1986).
303. Id.
304. Id. at 261.
305. Id.
306. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 154 (2003).
307. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 260-61.
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earnings into "'political war chests"' if they are allowed to make
independent expenditures.30s In fact, they cannot do so because they are
non-profit and so do not amass resources in the economic marketplace.309
Yet there is a danger that these same advocacy corporations will turn
corporate earnings into "political war chests" if they are allowed to make
contributions, 310 even though they are still non-profit and still do not
amass resources in the economic marketplace. 3 1 1 Further, there is no
need to protect donors from having their money used to fund
independent expenditures they may not agree with.312 Yet there is a need
to protect these same donors from having their money used to make
contributions to candidates with whom they may disagree. Side-by-
side, these rules are irreconcilable. Yet, such is the state of the law as a
result of the Beaumont Court's analytically flawed and wrong decision.
b. The PAC-option had already been rejected as inadequate to protect
speech rights.
Another flaw in Beaumont's reasoning stems from the fact that
the MCFL Court had already ruled that the PAC-option was inadequate
to protect First Amendment rights, calling the "restriction on speech ...
substantial," 314 and noting that it "discourage[d] protected speech." 31 1
The Court explained that employing a PAC to speak requires "very
significant efforts," 3 16 including the appointment of a treasurer,
308. Id. at 257-58 (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative
Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 501 (1985)). The Citizens United Court ruled
this concern inapplicable to all corporations making independent expenditures,
holding that all such expenditures are non-corrupting. Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. _, , 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010). But even prior to
Citizens United, the MCFL Court ruled that there was no corruption danger
associated with advocacy corporations' independent expenditures. See Mass.
Citizens For Life, 479 U.S. at 261.
309. Mass. Citizens For Life, 479 U.S. at 257-58.
310. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 154.
311. Id. at 159-60.
312. Mass. Citizens For Life, 479 U.S. at 260-61.
313. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 154.
314. Mass. Citizens For Life, 479 U.S. at 252.
315. Id. at 255; see also id. at 254 (finding that PAC-requirements may
create a "disincentive" to speech).
316. Id. at 252.
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registration with the government, detailed and intensive record-keeping,
and the filing of regular, ongoing and very detailed reports (even when
there is no activity to report). 317 Beyond that, PACs must identify every
contributor who donates more than fifty dollars, as well as the "name and
address" of anyone "to whom a disbursement is made regardless of
amount. PACs cannot even dissolve without notifying the
government. 3 9 And organizations required to employ a PAC certainly
cannot use general-fund money to fund their political speech.320 Rather,
they must comply with PAC rules allowing them to fund their PACs only
with donations from their "members," which, as the Court explained,
"does not include those persons who have merely contributed to or
indicated support for the organization in the past." 32 1
The MCFL Court contrasted the PAC-requirements with what is
required of non-PACs that make independent expenditures. Non-PACs
must file a one-time report identifying all donors who gave more than
two hundred dollars for the purpose of influencing elections, all
recipients of independent expenditures greater than two hundred dollars,
and all donors who earmarked more than two hundred dollars for
independent expenditures.322 Recognizing that "[i]t is evident . . . that
317. Id. at 253. These reports must disclose:
[lInformation regarding the amount of cash on hand; the total
amount of receipts, detailed by 10 different categories; the
identification of each political committee and candidate's
authorized or affiliated committee making contributions, and any
persons making loans, providing rebates, refunds, dividends, or
interest or any other offset to operating expenditures in an
aggregate amount over $200; the total amount of all
disbursements, detailed by 12 different categories; the names of
all authorized or affiliated committees to whom expenditures
aggregating over $200 have been made; persons to whom loan
repayments or refunds have been made; the total sum of all
contributions, operating expenses, outstanding debts and
obligations, and the settlement terms of the retirement of any debt
or obligation.
Id at 253-54.
318. Id. at 253.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 252.
321. Id. at 254.
322. Id. at 252.
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MCFL is subject to more extensive requirements and more stringent
restrictions than it would be if it were not incorporated,"323 the Court
declared requirements that organizations employing PACs are "an
infringement on First Amendment activities" 32 4 that "must be justified by
a compelling state interest." 3 25 Such an interest was "simply absent" with
regard to non-profit advocacy corporations.326 Consequently, the MCFL
Court ruled, non-profit advocacy corporations could not be forced to
employ PACs in order to engage in First Amendment activity.327
Instead of following MCFL, the Beaumont Court ruled the exact
opposite and held non-profit advocacy corporations can be forced to
employ PACs to engage in First Amendment activity.328 The Court said
that the PAC-requirement "permits some participation" by corporations
in the political process329 and therefore does not "jeopardiz[e] the
associational rights of advocacy organizations' members." 33 0 This was a
far cry from the MCFL Court's recognition that the PAC-requirement
was a "substantial" restriction 31 on First Amendment activity that: (1)
necessitated "very significant efforts" 3 32 in order to speak; (2) had the
effect of "creat[ing] a disincentive for,"3 33 and "discourag[ing]," 334 First
Amendment activity; and so (3) must survive strict scrutiny. 335 The
MCFL Court found the PAC-option incompatible with the requirements
of the First Amendment,336 except with regard to those organizations
having Buckley's "major purpose." 37 The Beaumont Court, on the other
hand, found that the PAC-requirement was permissible for all
323. Id. at 254.
324. Id. at 255.
325. Id. at 256.
326. Id. at 263.
327. Id. at 263-64.
328. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 149 (2003).
329. Id. at 162-63.
330. Id. at 163.
331. Mass. Citizens For Life, 479 U.S. at 252.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 254.
334. Id. at 255.
335. Id. at 256.
336. Id. at 263.
337. Id. at 253 n.6, 262.
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corporations, including non-profit advocacy ones, irrespective of whether
they had Buckley's major purpose.
This rule, of course, could not be squared with MCFL. The
Beaumont Court did not even attempt to reconcile its decision with the
Court's precedent. It simply added to the confused state of campaign
finance law by holding that, although the PAC-option is inadequate to
protect First Amendment rights for corporations making independent
expenditures, it provides satisfactory protection for corporations making
contributions.
c. Strict scrutiny should have been applied to section 441b's ban on
political speech and association.
The constitutional problem with contribution limits is that they
"impinge upon the First Amendment rights of both contributors and
candidates."338 They do this in several ways. First, contribution limits
"prevent contributors from speaking effectively in the political process
and from associating with the candidates of their choice." 3 39 They also
may "interfere with candidates' abilities to amass the financial resources
necessary to express themselves." 3 40 For limits to be constitutional, they
must "satisfy two separate tests - one which considers the First
Amendment rights of contributors and the other which considers the First
Amendment rights of candidates." 3 4 1
The Beaumont Court erred by evaluating section 441b's
contribution ban under less rigorous scrutiny than strict scrutiny. It noted
contribution limits involving "significant interference" with First
Amendment rights are constitutional "if it satisfies the lesser demand of
being 'closely drawn' to match a 'sufficiently important interest."'
342
Regardless of whether such less rigorous scrutiny is generally
338. James Bopp, Jr., Constitutional Limits on Campaign Contribution
Limits, 11 REGENT U. L. REV. 235, 239 (1999) (footnote omitted).
339. Id.
340. Id. at 239-40.
341. Id. at 240.
342. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 162 (2003)
(quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-88 (2000)).
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appropriate when evaluating laws limiting contributions,3 4 3 it is not
appropriate when analyzing laws that impose PAC burdens. Nor is it
appropriate when analyzing laws that completely ban First Amendment
speech and associational rights.
1) Laws compelling corporations to employ PACs to engage in First
Amendment activity are subject to strict scrutiny.
Requirements that organizations employ PACs to engage in First
Amendment activity must survive strict scrutiny. Referring to section
441b's PAC-requirement, the MCFL Court said, "When a statutory
provision burdens First Amendment rights [as the PAC requirement did],
it must be justified by a compelling state interest."344 The Court then
evaluated section 441b's PAC-requirement under the "least restrictive
345 1 46
means" standard. These are the hallmarks of strict scrutiny, which
the MCFL Court said was the proper test for laws requiring organizations
to employ PACs to engage in First Amendment activity.347
In violation of this constitutional imperative, the Beaumont
Court applied the less rigorous, "closely drawn" scrutiny that has come
to be associated with contribution limits. 3 48 Regardless of whether this is
the proper level of scrutiny for contribution limits, it is not proper for
laws requiring that organizations employ PACs.
343. See Bopp, supra note 338, at 239-43. (arguing that under Buckley v.
Valeo, contribution limits are subject to strict scrutiny because they not only burden
speech but also association).
344. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 256
(1986).
345. Id. at 262.
346. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449,
464 (2007) (explaining that the strict-scrutiny test requires the government to prove
its law is (1) narrowly tailored, to serve (2) a compelling state interest); Gonzales v.
O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 429 (2006)
(requiring that regulations subject to strict scrutiny use the "least restrictive means"
to accomplish the interest).
347. See Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 256.
348. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 162 (2003).
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2) Laws restricting contributions are subject to strict scrutiny.
Section 441b should have been subjected to strict scrutiny not
only because it required corporations to employ PACs to engage in First
Amendment activity, but also because it completely banned
contributions. Such complete bans of speech and associational rights
must be subject to the strictest scrutiny.
a) Buckley evaluated the challenged contribution limits under strict
scrutiny.
The Buckley Court instructed that while contribution limits
impose a "marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in
free communication," 349 the "primary First Amendment problem raised
by [contribution limits] is their restriction of one aspect of the
contributor's freedom of political association." 3 50 The freedom to
associate is a "'basic constitutional freedom,"' 3 51 lying "'at the
foundation of a free society."' 35 2 Consequently, "governmental 'action
which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is
subject to the closest scrutiny,,,,35 3 which the Court referred to as "the
rigorous standard of review established by [its] prior decisions" 354 and
"[t]he strict test." 35 5
What exactly the Court meant by "closest scrutiny," "rigorous
standard of review," and "the strict test" is subject to debate. The
Buckley Court defined the applicable scrutiny as requiring the
349. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1976).
350. Id. at 24-25.
351. Id. at 25 (quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973)).
352. Id. (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960)).
353. Id. at 25 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson., 357 U.S.
449, 460-61 (1958)).
354. Id. at 29.
355. Id. at 66.
356. See James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission: "Precisely What WRTL Sought to Avoid," 2010
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 29, 30 n.10 (2010). It has also been argued that under Buckley v.
Valeo, contribution limits are subject to strict scrutiny because they not only burden
speech but also association. See generally Bopp, supra note 338 (discussing
constitutional limitations on campaign finance).
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government to demonstrate that contribution limits were "closely drawn"
to a "sufficiently important interest" that avoided "unnecessary
abridgment of associational freedoms."3 57 The Supreme Court
subsequently took Buckley to mean something less than the "narrowly
tailored" to a "compelling interest" requirement of strict scrutiny, which
it applied to expenditure limits.35 8 However, various members of the
Court have criticized this distinction. 35 9 This was true even in the
357. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
358. See, e.g., McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 134
(2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S.
, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) ("In Buckley and subsequent cases, we have subjected
restrictions on campaign expenditures to closer scrutiny than limits on campaign
contributions."); id. at 291 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part &
dissenting in part) ("Buckley subjected expenditure limits to strict scrutiny and
contribution limits to less exacting review."); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass.
Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 259-60 (1986) ("We have consistently held that
restrictions on contributions require less compelling justification than restrictions on
independent spending."). See also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,
387 (2000) (noting that the application of "closely drawn" scrutiny to contribution
limits means those limits will "more readily clear the hurdles before them" than
expenditure limits).
359. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 137 ("Our application of this less
rigorous degree of scrutiny has given rise to significant criticism in the past from our
dissenting colleagues."). Three of the current members of the Court have expressed
vigorous disagreement with Buckley's distinction between contributions and
expenditures. Justice Thomas, for instance, has repeatedly called for Buckley's
distinction between limits on contributions and expenditures to be overruled. See,
e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 266-67 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Fed.
Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colorado II), 533
U.S. 431, 465 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Nixon, 528 U.S. at 410 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm.
(Colorado 1), 518 U.S. 604, 631 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment &
dissenting in part). Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas's call for overruling Buckley
in Randall, Colorado II, and Nixon. Justice Kennedy joined Justice Thomas in
Colorado II. Justice Kennedy also suggested that Buckley was a "misstep" in Nixon,
528 U.S. at 405-10 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), calling for the campaign finance
system Buckley established to be re-evaluated, and he expressed his "skepticism"
regarding Buckley's system for evaluating contributions in Randall, 548 U.S. at 265
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). In Randall, Justice Kennedy opined that
the system created in Buckley for evaluating campaign finance regulation "may
cause more problems than it solves." Id. at 264-65. He explained: "[T]he present
system requires us to explain why $200 is too restrictive a limit [for contributions]
while $1,500 is not. Our own experience gives us little basis to make these
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Buckley concurrences and dissents. Chief Justice Burger, concurring in
part and dissenting in part, argued that "[t]he contribution limitations [at
issue in Buckley] infringe on First Amendment liberties and suffer from
the same infirmities that the Court correctly sees in the expenditure
ceilings."360 And Justice Blackmun, also concurring in part and
dissenting in part, stated that he was "not persuaded that the Court
makes, or indeed is able to make, a principled constitutional distinction
between the contribution limitations, on the one hand, and the
expenditure limitations, on the other, that are involved here." 6 ' Beyond
that, though, the scrutiny Buckley applied to contribution limits required
that the law "avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational
freedoms,',362 which is consistent with the strict scrutiny requirement that
regulations not "'unnecessarily circumscribe protected expression,"'
36 3
but use "the least restrictive means." 36
Because Buckley referred to the level of scrutiny as "the closest
scrutiny," "the rigorous standard established by our prior decisions," and
"the strict test," and also utilized the "least restrictive means" language,
it is reasonable to conclude that, irrespective of how subsequent Court's
have interpreted Buckley, the Buckley Court actually applied strict
scrutiny to both the expenditure and contribution limits. After all, both
limits directly infringe First Amendment rights,365 and "operate in an
area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities." 3 66
Expenditure limits, of course, directly infringe free speech rights.367
Contribution limits, meanwhile, also directly infringe speech rights
judgments, and certainly no traditional or well-established body of law exists to offer
guidance." Id. at 265.
360. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 235 (Burger, CJ., concurring in part &
dissenting in part).
361. Id. at 290 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
362. Id. at 25 (citation omitted).
363. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775 (2002)
(quoting Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 54 (1982)).
364. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546
U.S. 418, 429 (2006).
365. Bopp, supra note 338 at 237-45 (arguing that under Buckley,
contribution limits are subject to strict scrutiny because they not only burden speech
but also association).
366. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
367. Id. at 39.
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because a contribution is "a general expression of support." 36 8 But even
more significantly, contribution limits directly infringe the right to
associate,369 which is the "primary First Amendment problem" raised by
contribution limits. 3 70 Because both expenditure and contribution limits
directly infringe First Amendment freedoms, it is reasonable to conclude
that the Buckley Court - though imprecise in its language - applied
the same level of scrutiny to both.37 1 After all, as the Nixon Court noted,
"Precision about the relative rigor of the standard to review contribution
limits was not a pretense of the Buckley per curiam opinion.',372
If we are correct in our suggestion that it was strict scrutiny that
Buckley applied, as Citizens Against Rent Control indicates, then the
Buckley Court upheld the contribution limits because the interest in
curbing the quid pro quo financial corruption associated with large
contributions satisfied the compelling interest requirement. And the
choice to impose a limit rather than a ban satisfied the tailoring
requirement by avoiding unnecessary abridgment of First Amendment
freedoms.
In the next contribution limit case to reach the Court, Citizens
Against Rent Control,3 73 the Court agreed with our contention that
contribution limits should be evaluated under strict scrutiny. Relying on
Buckley, the Berkeley Court noted that contributions are "a very
significant form of political expression" 3 74 and association.375 And limits
on contributions thus impact both of those rights. The freedom to
associate is "diluted" by contribution limits. And contribution limits
377
also impose a "significant restraint" on the freedom of expression.
Additionally, a limit on contributions automatically "affects" and
378
"limits" expenditures by those to whom contributions are made.
368. Id. at 21. See discussion infra Section V.C. 1 for an analysis of why
contributions are the contributor's political speech.
369. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24-25.
370. Id at 24.
371. Bopp, supra note 338, at 242.
372. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386 (2000).
373. 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
374. Id. at 298.
375. Id. at 296.
376. Id
377. Id. at 299.
378. Id.
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Following this analysis, the Court twice noted that "regulation of
First Amendment rights is always subject to exacting judicial [review or
scrutiny],"3 79 without any suggestion that different levels of scrutiny
apply for contribution and expenditure limits.3o The Court then
considered whether the government had advanced a compelling interest
in the contribution limit, and concluded that it had not.38 The limit was
therefore unconstitutional. 3 82
b) Contribution bans must be evaluated under strict scrutiny.
The proper level of scrutiny for contribution limits is the strict
scrutiny that is applied to expenditure limits. That is what Buckley
taught, and Citizens Against Rent Control re-affirmed. But regardless of
whether the Buckley Court applied strict or some lesser scrutiny to
contribution limits, the fact remains that, as campaign finance law
developed, contribution limits have been subjected to less rigorous
scrutiny than expenditure limits.38 Still, the Beaumont Court should
have applied strict scrutiny to section 441b, because it did not just limit
contributions. Rather, it banned them, thereby completely prohibiting
First Amendment political association.384
The Beaumont Court recognized this when it noted that section
441b imposed "[a] ban on direct corporate contributions.,385 Still, it said
this was not really a ban, since it allowed corporations to employ PACs
to make contributions.38 6 That allowance, however, did not let the
379. Id. at 294, 298.
380. See Bopp, supra note 338, at 242 (noting that "not only did the Court
not apply a test other than strict scrutiny, but it twice stated that when First
Amendment rights are impacted, regardless of degree, strict scrutiny is always
required").
381. Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 299.
382. Id.
383. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 134-35 (2003),
overruled in part by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. _, 130 S.
Ct. 876 (2010).
384. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1976) (explaining that "the
primary First Amendment problem raised by . . . contribution limitations is their
restriction of. . . political association").
385. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161 n.8 (2003).
386. Id. at 162.
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corporation itself associate with candidates. Only its PAC - a separate
legal entity - could associate. Section 441b thus banned all corporate
association with their candidates of choice.
Laws that impose "severe burdens" on the right to associate are
subject to strict scrutiny, 3 and it is difficult to imagine a more "severe
burden" than an outright ban. In fact, Buckley held that contribution
limits were permissible precisely because they were not a ban but rather
permitted some contributions and so allowed contributors and candidates
318to associate. Contributors could still make contributions, giving their
"symbolic expression of support," even though the total amount they
may contribute is limited.389 This is constitutionally significant, because
"[m]aking a contribution, like joining a political party, serves to affiliate
a person with a candidate." 39 0 Because contribution limits leave
contributors free to associate with candidates and parties, they are
permissible if they satisfy applicable scrutiny. 39 1
Section 44 1b, however, did not just limit corporate contributions.
It banned them. The Beaumont Court should have applied strict scrutiny.
Had the Court done so, it would have invalidated the ban, for a limit on
contributions is a less restrictive infringement on associational rights
than a complete ban.
d. The Court accepted a public distrust of corporate
contributions as adequate justification for banning them.
A final flaw in the Beaumont Court's reasoning, leading it to the
wrong decision, was its acceptance of the underlying justification for the
corporate contribution ban. The Court explained that section 441b's ban
"grew out of a popular feeling in the late 19th century that aggregated
387. See, e.g., Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 586 (2005)
("Regulations that impose severe burdens on associational rights must be narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest."); Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New
Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358-59 (1997) ("Regulations imposing severe burdens on
[associational] rights must be narrowly tailored and advance a compelling state
interest.").
388. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28.
389. Id. at 21.
390. Id. at 22.
391. Id. at 25.
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capital unduly influenced politics, an influence not stopping short of
corruption., 39 2 Congress therefore enacted a ban on corporate
393 394
contributions because doing so was popular. Yet, the desire of some
to restrict the rights of others cannot justify such restrictions.395
Otherwise, any majority would be able to strip minorities of their
constitutional rights. A law that is constitutionally defective is not saved
396because it enjoys popular support.
Section 44 1b's ban on corporate contributions was
constitutionally defective. It discriminated against corporate speech, in
violation of Bellotti. It completely banned corporations from associating
with candidates. It offered as an alternative the PAC-option, which had
already been held to be insufficient to protect First Amendment rights. 39 7
The law should have been declared unconstitutional for any of these
reasons. Instead, the Beaumont Court noted that the ban had been
enacted because of the will of the people.398 And so, in its analytically
flawed decision, the Court upheld the ban.3 99
Austin said that the government may constitutionally ban
corporations from engaging in political speech by making independent
expenditures.40 0 Beaumont now said that the government may
constitutionally ban corporations from engaging in political speech and
association by making contributions. 40 1 These cases paved the way for
McConnell's final nail in the coffin, when the Court said that government
392. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 152 (2003).
393. Id. at 152-53.
394. Id. at 152.
395. C.f Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (holding an amendment
discriminating against minority citizens unconstitutional, even though it had been
enacted by a majority vote); Lucas v. Colo. Gen. Assem., 377 U.S. 713, 736 (1964)
(declaring that an apportionment scheme cannot be saved merely because it was
approved by majority vote); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (finding that
an article of a state constitution allowing citizens to discriminate on the basis of race
could not be saved, even though it was enacted by popular vote).
396. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 392.
397. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 163 (2003).
398. Id. at 152.
399. Id. at 149.
400. See supra Section I.C.5.
401. See supra Section II.D.
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may constitutionally ban corporations from engaging in political speech
through electioneering communications.
E. McConnell held that the government may ban corporate
electioneering communications because they are made by
corporations.
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission402 is, in terms of
number of pages, the longest opinion ever issued by the Supreme
403 404Court. The case had a multitude of plaintiffs and attorneys and
involved numerous challenges to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
of 2002 (BCRA),4 05 which amended the Federal Election Campaign Act
406
of 1971 (FECA). Among the provisions challenged was BCRA section
203,407 which banned corporations from making disbursements for
electioneering communications.408 The Court explained that "under
BCRA, corporations and unions may not use their general treasury funds
402. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled
in part by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010).
403. Ryan P. Chase, Note, The Future ofSoft Money in Federal Elections:
The 527 Reform Act of 2005 and the First Amendment, 67 U. PITr. L. REV. 445, 453
n.59 (2005) (explaining that McConnell's almost 150 pages in the Supreme Court
Reporter is the longest in history, while its word count of 89,694 words is second
only to the 109,163 words in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856)).
404. James Bopp, Jr. represented the following parties before the Supreme
Court in National Right to Life Committee v. Federal Election Comm'n (No. 02-
1733; consolidated with McConnell) as clients of the James Madison Center for Free
Speech: U.S. Representative Mike Pence, Alabama Attorney General Bill Pryor,
Libertarian National Committee, Inc., Club for Growth, Inc., Indiana Family
Institute, Inc., National Right to Life Committee, Inc., National Right to Life
Educational Trust Fund, National Right to life Political Action Committee, Trevor
M. Southerland, and Barret Austin O'Brock
405. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified in scattered sections of 2,
18, 36, and 47 U.S.C.).
406. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§
431-455 (2002)).
407. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002 § 203, 2 U.S.C. §
441b(b)(2), invalidated by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S _,
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
408. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 203-04 (2003),
overruled in part by Citizens United, 558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
to finance electioneering communications, but they remain free to
organize and administer segregated funds, or PACs, for that purpose." 4 09
Following Beaumont'S4 10 analytically flawed reasoning, the Court said
that because corporations had the option to employ PACs to speak for
them, it was 'simply wrong' to characterize section 203 as a ban on
corporate speech.411 Rather, the Court saw this regulation as a limit on
412
speech.
The McConnell Court next considered whether the government
had an interest in restricting corporate electioneering communications
and asserted that it had several. First was the interest already articulated
in Austin413 in limiting the "corrosive and distorting effects" of immense
corporate wealth.414 Second, the Court found an interest in preventing
circumvention,415  which it suggested, without explanation, was
416
undermined by allowing corporate electioneering communications.
And third, the Court accepted the idea that there is an interest in limiting
corporate speech and association simply because the one speaking or
associating is a corporation. Citing Beaumont,4 17 the McConnell Court
said that prior cases demonstrate 'respect for the legislative judgment
that the special characteristics of the corporate structure require
particularly careful regulation."'418 It therefore held that the ban on
corporate electioneering communications, provided by BCRA section
203, was constitutional. 4 19
In so holding, the McConnell Court divested corporate persons
of their final option for engaging in their own political speech and
409. Id. at 204.
410. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
411. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 204.
412. Id.
413. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990),
overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010).
414. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 205 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660)).
415. Id. (citing Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 155).
416. Id. (stating, without explanation, that "recent cases have recognized
that certain restrictions on corporate electoral involvement permissibly hedge against
circumvention of contribution limits") (internal quotation marks omitted).
417. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146.
418. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 205 (quoting Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 155).
419. Id. at 209.
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association. Austin had stripped corporations of the right to make
independent expenditures advocating for the election or defeat of
candidates. Beaumont had stripped them of the right to make
contributions. And McConnell finished the job by stripping corporations
of the right to make electioneering communications. Every avenue for
engaging in election-related political speech and association was
foreclosed to corporations. Corporations were, for all intents and
purposes, silenced and marginalized. And so they would remain until the
Court decided Citizens United.
III. WISCONSNRIGHT TO LIFE: THE RETURN TO A Focus ON SPEECH IN
FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE.
Prior to the Citizens United decision, however, the Supreme
Court decided Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life,
Inc.420 In this case, the Court reversed itself and focused once again upon
speech, rather than on the fact that the speaker was a corporation.
Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL 11) was the harbinger of Citizens United,
paving the way for the "return to the principle established in Buckley and
Bellotti that the Government may not suppress political speech on the
basis of the speaker's corporate identity."4 21
In WRTL II, our firm represented Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., a
nonprofit advocacy corporation that challenged the federal law banning
422 423
corporate electioneering communications upheld in McConnell.
Wisconsin Right to Life wanted to engage in "issue advocacy," which is
speech that "focus[es] on a legislative issue, take[s] a position on the
issue, exhort[s] the public to adopt that position, and urge[s] the public to
contact public officials with respect to the matter." 424 It wanted to run its
ads during August and ask the voters to contact their United States
420. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right To Life (WRTL II), 551 U.S.
449 (2007).
421. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. , ,130 S.
Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
422. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002 § 203, 2 U.S.C. §
441b(b)(2), invalidated by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S.
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
423. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 209.
424. WRTL 11, 551 U.S. at 470.
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Senator about an on-going filibuster of judicial nominees. 425 The ad
mentioned the Senator by name, so it would be an electioneering
communication as of August 15, because it would be within 30 days of
426
the Wisconsin primary held on September 14 that year. BCRA section
203 made it illegal for corporations to make electioneering
427
communications.
BCRA statutorily requires all challenges to it to be heard by a
428
three-judge panel in the District Court for the District of Columbia, so
we filed suit in that court on behalf of Wisconsin Right to Life and asked
421for an as-applied preliminary injunction against BCRA section 203.
The court denied our motion because, the court said, McConnell had
foreclosed any challenge to BCRA.430
The court subsequently dismissed Wisconsin Right to Life's
complaint.4 3 1 Statutorily, the Supreme Court is authorized to review the
432district court's decisions related to BCRA, so we asked for Supreme
Court review. In Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. Federal Election
Commission (WRTL 1),433 the Supreme Court reversed, holding that
McConnell's upholding of BCRA against a facial challenge did not
foreclose as-applied challenges.4 34 The Court therefore vacated the
district court's dismissal of Wisconsin Right to Life's complaint,
instructing it to consider the merits of the as-applied challenge.435
Returning to the district court, we filed Wisconsin Right to
436Life's motion for summary judgment, asking the court to declare
425. Id. at 458-59.
426. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 466 F. Supp. 2d
195, 199 n.8 (D. D.C. 2006).
427. WRTL I, 551 U.S. at 460.
428. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002 § 403, 2 U.S.C. §
437h note (2006).
429. Wisconsin Right to Life, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 200.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 403(a)(3), 116 Stat. 81, 114 (2002);
28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2010).
433. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n (WRTL 1), 546 U.S.
410 (2006).
434. Id. at 411-12.
435. Id. at 412.
436. Wisconsin Right to Life, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 201.
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BCRA section 203 unconstitutional as-applied.437 The district court held
that Wisconsin Right to Life's proposed ads were not regulable express
advocacy438 or the functional equivalent,439 and the government had not
advanced a compelling interest in regulating issue advocacy.4 40 The court
therefore granted Wisconsin Right to Life's motion for summary
judgment, declaring the ban on corporate electioneering communications
unconstitutional as applied to the issue advocacy in which Wisconsin
441Right to Life wanted to engage.
The Federal Election Commission appealed to the Supreme
442Court. The WRTL II Court ruled that the focus of its analysis must be
on the proposed speech of Wisconsin Right to Life, rather than upon
other considerations443 - including the fact that the proposed speaker
was a corporation.444 Although the WRTL II Court recognized that
Austin and McConnell had found an antidistortion interest supporting the
limiting of corporate speech, it noted that such an interest was only
applicable to "campaign speech." 4 45 If Wisconsin Right to Life's speech
was something else, the antidistortion interest was inapplicable and the
speech could not be proscribed merely because the speaker was a
.446
corporation.
The Court announced that the proper test to determine whether
speech is "the functional equivalent of express advocacy," and therefore
regulable, is whether "the ad is susceptible of no reasonable
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific
437. Id. at 204.
438. "Express advocacy" refers to speech that contains Buckley's "express
words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as 'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast
your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,' 'reject."' Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976).
439. Wisconsin Right to Life, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 208. McConnell had
specifically held that BCRA was constitutional, so far as it regulated express
advocacy or its functional equivalent. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540
U.S. 93, 205-07 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 976 (2010).
440. Wisconsin Right to Life, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 210.
441. Id.
442. WRTL II, 551 U.S. 449, 461 (2007).
443. Id. at 469.
444. Id. at 479-80.
445. Id.
446. Id.
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candidate."447 Applying that test to Wisconsin Right to Life's proposed
speech, the Court concluded the speech was "plainly not the functional
equivalent of express advocacy."448 It was therefore not "campaign
speech" but issue advocacy, so the antidistortion interest was
inapplicable.449 The Court concluded that, when deciding whether
particular speech may be constitutionally regulated, "we give the benefit
of the doubt to speech, not censorship."450 It therefore held that because
the Federal Election Commission had not advanced a compelling interest
in regulating issue advocacy, such advocacy could not be proscribed. 4 5 1
BCRA section 203 was therefore unconstitutional as applied to
452Wisconsin Right to Life's proposed speech.
This focus on speech by the WRTL II Court was a welcome
departure from focus on the speaker that guided the Austin, Beaumont,
and McConnell Courts.5 They each concluded that speech that could
not be prohibited if the speaker was an individual could be prohibited
when the speaker was a corporation.4 54 Thus, their focus was on the
corporate identity of the speaker, rather than the proposed speech and
association. 4 55 Bellotti, though, had held that the First Amendment
protects speech, regardless of who the speaker is, noting that "[t]he
inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the
public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether
,,456
corporation, association, union, or individual.' Austin, Beaumont, and
McConnell turned away from Bellotti's pronouncement. In WRTL II, the
Court once again put the focus on speech, ruling that the government
may not prohibit speech that would otherwise be unregulable if the
speaker was not a corporation.
447. Id. at 469-70.
448. Id. at 470.
449. Id. at 481.
450. Id. at 482.
451. Id. at 481.
452. Id.
453. See supra Sections IIB, II.C, & II.E.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. First Nat'1 Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978).
See also id. at 795 (holding that the ban on corporate speech was invalid because the
speech was protected, and the government had not justified infringing it with a
compelling interest).
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IV. CITIZENS UNITED: THE "RETURN[ ] TO THE PRINCIPLE ESTABLISHED
IN BUCKLEY AND BELLOTTI THAT THE GOVERNMENT MAY NOT
SUPPRESS POLITICAL SPEECH ON THE BASIS OF THE SPEAKER'S
CORPORATE IDENTITY"
Citizens United57 has accurately been described as "a game
changer" by one lower court.45 8 It overruled Austin,459 as well as the part
of McConnell460 that extended Austin's rule to prohibit corporate
461
electioneering communications. In Citizens United, the Court
"retum[ed] to the principle established in Buckley and Bellotti that the
Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the
speaker's corporate identity." 462 Finding no compelling interest in
prohibiting corporate independent expenditures, the Citizens United
Court declared section 441b's requirement, that corporations making
independent expenditures or electioneering communications employ a
461PAC to do so, was unconstitutional.
The procedural history of the Citizens United case may be
summarized as follows. The organization, Citizens United, is a non-
profit, non-member advocacy corporation organized under section
464501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code. Citizens United had made a
457. Citizens United, 558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 876. James Bopp, Jr. and
his firm, Bopp, Coleson & Bostrom, served as counsel for Citizens United in the
district court and prepared the jurisdictional statement upon which the Supreme
Court granted review. When Citizens United retained Ted Olson as lead counsel, we
withdrew.
458. Transcript of Proceedings at 39, Family PAC v. Reed, No. C09-
5662RBL (W.D. Wash. Sept. 1, 2010). The transcript is available in PACER as
Document 88 in the case file.
459. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990),
overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. , 130 S. Ct. 876.
460. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled
in part by Citizens United, 558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 976.
461. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 913. Electioneering
communications are essentially targeted broadcast ads naming federal candidates in
30- and 60-day periods before primaries and general elections, respectively. See 2
U.S.C. § 434(f)(3) (2010).
462. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at , 130 S. Ct. at 913.
463. Id.
464. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 275
(D.D.C. 2008).
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465
movie, called Hillary: The Movie, which was critical of Senator
Hillary Clinton, a candidate for the Democratic nomination for President
466
of the United States. It wanted to use its general funds to advertise and
distribute the movie during the period immediately before the
Democratic Primary.4 67 If Senator Clinton won the Democratic
nomination, Citizens United wanted to use its general funds to advertise
and distribute its movie during the period immediately before the
468 469
election. However, federal law prevented Citizens United from
using corporate funds to place advertisements or broadcast the movie
during the time periods it wanted to, because such advertisements and
broadcasts during the thirty days before a primary and sixty days before a
general election were illegal corporate electioneering communications.47 0
Citizens United could employ a PAC to make these expenditures as
471
allowed by section 441b. Citizens United did not want to employ a
PAC, but wanted to make general fund expenditures. It therefore
challenged the prohibition on corporate general-fund electioneering
communications as it applied to them and asked for a preliminary
472 473injunction, which the district court denied. Citizens United and the
Federal Election Commission each moved for summary judgment.4 74 The
court granted the Federal Election Commission's motion, denied Citizens
United's, and entered judgment for the Federal Election Commission.47 5
Citizens United asked the Supreme Court for relief. The Court
noted probable jurisdiction476 and heard oral arguments on March 24,
2009. Although Citizens United's merit brief asked the Court to overrule
465. HILLARY: THE MOVIE (Citizens United Prod. 2008).
466. Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 277.
467. Id.
468. Id. at 276.
469. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002 § 203, 2 U.S.C. §
441b(b)(2), invalidatedby Citizens United, 558 U.S. , 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
470. Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 277.
471. Id. at 277, n.7.
472. Id. at 277.
473. Id. at 282.
474. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, No. 07-2240, 2008 WL
2788753, at *1 (D.D.C. July 18, 2008).
475. Id.
476. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 555 U.S. _ , 129 S. Ct.
594 (2008) (mem.).
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Austin, at oral argument it abandoned that request.477 Court watchers
expected the Court to issue a decision near the end of the 2008-09
term.478 Instead, the Court ordered the parties to submit supplemental
briefing addressing this question: "For the proper disposition of this case,
should the Court overrule either or both Austin . . . and the part of
McConnell. . . which addresses the facial validity of [the electioneering-
communication prohibition]?"4 79 Both sides, as well as numerous amici,
briefed the question. Our firm filed an amicus brief on behalf of seven
former chairmen and one former commissioner of the Federal Election
Commission. In that brief, we acknowledged that the Court could decide
the case for Citizens United on other grounds and so did not have to
overturn Austin and McConnell. However, we invited the Court to
480
overrule them anyway because they had proved to be unworkable. We
explained:
However, it would be appropriate, and in fact
desirable, for the Court to overrule these troublesome
precedents because (1) both are properly implicated for
reconsideration, (2) "Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech" has special force in
protecting political speech, (3) Austin and McConnell
have proven to be unworkable, having spawned many
complex, multi-factor tests, and (4) the FEC and lower
courts have made the appeal-to-vote test in [WRTL Il]
unworkable. Austin and its progeny should be
overruled.48 1
On January 21, 2010, the Court issued its long-awaited opinion,
which expressly agreed with us regarding the unworkability of the
current regime of campaign finance law. The Court noted that, as we had
477. James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Citizens United v. Federal
Elections Commission: "Precisely What WRTL Sought To Avoid, " 2010 CATO SUP.
CT. REV. 29, 49 (2010).
478. Id
479. Id
480. Id at 49-50.
481. Brief Amici Curiae of Seven Former Chairmen & One Former
Comm'ner of the Fed. Election Comm'n Supporting Appellant on Supplemental
Question at 2, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct.
876 (2010) (No. 08-205).
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pointed out in our amicus brief, "[c]ampaign finance regulations now
impose 'unique and complex rules' on '71 distinct entities" 4 82 who are
"subject to separate rules for 33 different types of political speech." 4 8 3
Further, "[t]he FEC has adopted 568 pages of regulations, 1,278 pages of
explanations and justifications for those regulations, and 1,771 advisory
opinions since 1975.",484 The Federal Election Commission's rule-
making tendency had even perverted WRTL II's simple, straightforward
appeal to vote test for determining whether speech was the functional
equivalent of express advocacy.485 To implement the test, the Federal
Election Commission adopted a two-part, 11-factor balancing test.486
Because of all this regulation, many simply chose not to speak - for
them, the risk had become too great, and the cost too high, to engage in
487
activity the First Amendment protects. As the Court noted, "[t]his is
precisely what [WRTL 11] sought to avoid."4 88
Recognizing that Austin and its progeny had helped create an
489
unworkable, speech-restrictive system, and that there was no
compelling interest in restricting corporate independent expenditures,4 90
the Citizens United Court declared that prohibitions on corporate
general-fund independent expenditures and electioneering
communications are unconstitutional, thereby overruling Austin and part
of McConnell.491
482. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at , 130 S. Ct. at 895 (quoting Brief
Amici Curiae of Seven Former Chairmen of the Fed. Election Comm'n et al., supra
note 481, at 11-12).
483. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 895 (quoting Brief
Amici Curiae of Seven Former Chairmen of the Fed. Election Comm'n et al., supra
note 481, at 14-15 n.10).
484. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 895 (quoting Brief
Amici Curiae of Seven Former Chairmen of the Fed. Election Comm'n et al., supra
note 481, at 6 n.7).
485. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 895 (citing Fed.
Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL 11), 551 U.S. 449, 470
(2007)).
486. Id. (citing 11 C.F.R. § 114.15 (2007)).
487. Id. at 896.
488. Id.
489. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 893-96.
490. Id. at _ 130 S. Ct. at 909.
491. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 913.
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To say that this created an uproar is to put it mildly. Citizens
United has been called potentially "the most Machiavellian [decision] in
American history."4 92 Keith Olbermann, then of MSNBC, went even
further in his the-sky-is-falling criticism, stating that the Citizens United
decision "might actually have more dire implications than Dred Scott,"4 3
the case holding that those of African descent were not protected by the
Constitution and could never be United States citizens.494 We find it
difficult to imagine how a decision that (1) restricted no one's rights, (2)
defended the First Amendment by striking a ban on speech, and (3)
allowed for more speech about elections so as to create a better-informed
electorate, could have "more dire implications" than a case that took
away citizenship rights. But apparently Keith Olbermann saw things
differently.
It was not just media personalities who made doomsday
pronouncements about Citizens United. Members of government did as
well. For instance, on the day the Court issued its decision, then-Rep.
Alan Grayson (D-Fla.) called it "the worst Supreme Court decision since
the Dred Scott case." 4 95 One can only hope that Mr. Grayson had
forgotten about other cases that might have better claim to the title,
4 C 496
"worst decision since Dred Scott," such as Plessy v. Ferguson, which
upheld so-called "separate but equal" laws discriminating on the basis of
race, and Korematsu v. United States,497 which held that it was
constitutional to force Japanese-Americans into internment camps during
the Second World War. Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick J.
492. E.J. Dionne Jr., Op-Ed., The Price of Independence: Repairing
Citizens United Becomes a Test for Three GOP Senators, WASH. POST, Sept. 15,
2010, at Al5.
493. Dispelling the Top Five Citizens United Decision Myths, INSTITUTE
FOR JUSTICE, Jan, 26, 2010, http://www.ij.org/index.php?option=
comcontent&task=view&id=3063&Itemid=165. Video of Mr. Olbermann making
his comments about Citizens United is available on YouTube at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-PKZKETizybw (last visited Mar. 2, 2011).
494. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
495. Grayson: SCOTUS Decision Worst Since Dred Scott, POLITICO, Jan.
21, 2010, http://www.politico.com/blogs/glennthrush/0110/
GraysonSCOTUSdecision worst since Dred Scott.html.
496. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
497. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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Leahy (D-Vt.), meanwhile, stated that the decision was a "partisan" 49 8
one that "turns the idea of government of, by, and for the people on its
head," by "threaten[ing] to allow corporations to drown out the
individual voices of hard-working Americans in our elections." 499 And
six days after Citizens United was decided, in the State of the Union
Address, President Obama uttered the fantastic claim that Citizens United
allows foreign companies to spend in American elections, oo leading
Justice Alito, who was sitting in the audience in the House chamber, to
mouth "not true."50 The president was wrong, and Justice Alito was
correct.502
The doomsday predictions made about Citizens United have
failed to materialize.o 3 However, that does not mean that Citizens United
has not had far-reaching effects. Indeed, it is one of the more significant
cases for campaign finance law, for it returned to Bellotti's maxim that
498. 156 CONG. REC. S273, 275 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2010) (statement of
Sen. Leahy), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getpage.cgi?position=all&page=S273&dbname=2010_record.
499. Id. at 274.
500. Barack Obama, President of the United States, State of the Union
Address (Jan. 27, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address). The text of this speech was also
printed online by THE NEW YORK TIMES,
athttp://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/28/us/politics/28obama.text.html (last visited
Mar. 2, 2011).
501. Major Garrett, WH Defends Obama/Alito Flap over Citizens United
Case, FoxNEWS.COM, Jan. 28, 2010, http://politics.blogs.foxnews.com
/2010/01/28/wh-defends-obamaalito-flap-over-citizens-united-case.
502. Existing federal law prohibits "a partnership, association,
corporation, organization, or other combination of persons organized under the laws
of or having its principal place of business in a foreign country," 22 U.S.C. § 611
(2006), from making a direct or indirect campaign donation or expenditure "in
connection with a Federal, State, or local election." Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act (BCRA) of 2002 § 303, 2 U.S.C. § 441e (2006). It also blocks donations or
expenditures of this kind to a political party committee or "for an electioneering
communication." 2 U.S.C. § 441e (2006). The Citizens United Court explicitly said
that it did not reach the question of whether section 441e was constitutional. Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. _, _, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010).
503. Bradley Smith, Op-Ed., The Incumbent's Bane: Citizens United and
the 2010 Election, WSJ.cOM, Jan. 25, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10 00 14 24 0 527 4 87035558 04576101 6 2 2 39 8 145818.h
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the First Amendment protects speech, and so the government may not
ban speech merely because the speaker is a corporation. In doing so, the
Citizens United Court articulated seven speech-protective principles.
First, the government may not discriminate among speakers, allowing
speech by some but not by others.5  Second, there is no inherent danger
in the corporate form, so there is no inherent danger in corporate
speech. 05 Third, the interest in preventing the quid pro quo financial
corruption that can arise from large contributions is the only
constitutionally cognizable interest supporting restrictions on political
speech and association.s50 Fourth, bans on political speech are not
507 508
permissible. Fifth, PACs cannot speak for corporationso. Sixth, laws
that burden speech are subject to strict scrutiny. 509 And seventh, when
evaluating laws in the First Amendment context, courts must determine
whether legislative remedies comply with the Constitution, without
deference to the legislature's determination of the remedy's
constitutionality.510 The principles Citizens United announced led to the
explicit rule that government may not limit corporate independent
expenditures or electioneering communications. They also lead to the
conclusion that bans on corporate contributions must fall as well.5 i
A. The government may not discriminate among speakers.
Both Buckley512 and Bellotti 1 had announced speech-protective
rules that prevented the government from discriminating against
disfavored First Amendment actors by preventing them from exercising
their political speech and associational rights. Buckley held that the
504. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 898-99. See infra
Section IV.A.
505. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 913. See infra Section IV.B.
506. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 901. See infra Section IV.C.
507. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 911. See infra Section IV.D.
508. Id at , 130 S. Ct. at 897. See infra Section IV.E.
509. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 898. See infra Section IV.F.
510. Id. at ,130 S. Ct. at 911. See infra Section IV.G.
511. See infra Section V.D. (arguing that Beaumont should be overruled).
512. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
513. First Nat'1 Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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government is constitutionally forbidden to "restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others,"
calling such government censorship "wholly foreign to the First
Amendment."514 Further, the government may not censor First
Amendment activity because of considerations such as the person's
wealth. Because democracy depends on citizens who are informed, the
government simply may not prohibit disfavored speakers from
.516
speaking.
Bellotti applied those principles to the question concerning
whether the government could constitutionally silence corporate persons'
political speech. The Court concluded that the First Amendment protects
517
speech, so it does not matter if the speaker is a corporation. Speech is
, 518
protected, no matter who the speaker is.
Citizens United reaffirmed this principle when it explained that
the government is constitutionally prohibited from "distinguishing
among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others."1 It
is the public's right "to determine for itself what speech and speakers are
worthy of consideration"52 0 and to determine whether speech is true or
false.521 The government may not silence those judged dangerous or
otherwise deprive the public the opportunity to hear all who want to
speak.522 "The First Amendment protects speech and speaker, and the
ideas that flow from each."5 2 3 There is simply "no basis" for the idea that
the government may limit the political speech of "disfavored
,,524 2
speakers, including "those that have taken on the corporate form. 525
514. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49. Other cases have said the same. See, e.g.,
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) ("The First Amendment does
not permit . . . special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on
disfavored subjects.").
515. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49.
516. See id.
517. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776-77.
518. Id. at 784.
519. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. , , 130 S.
Ct. 876, 898 (2010).
520. Id. at ,_ 130 S. Ct. at 899.
521. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 907.
522. Id.
523. Id. at __ 130 S. Ct. at 899.
524. Id.
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Consequently, the government may not allow speech by
individuals while banning the same speech by corporations.52 The
527
government must treat individual and corporate speakers the same.
Citizens United also clarified that this "treat speakers the same"
requirement is the basis for the constitutional prohibition against making
528
speech-distinctions on the basis of the wealth of the speaker.
Explaining Buckley's maxim, the Citizens United Court explained that
"[t]he rule that political speech cannot be limited based on a speaker's
wealth is a necessary consequence of the premise that the First
Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of political speech based
on the speaker's identity."529
The Citizens United Court further explained that speech
regulations based on the identity of the speaker are too often thinly-
veiled content-based regulations of speech. 30 Such restrictions are
presumptively unconstitutional, for "above all else, the First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."531 Therefore, when
regulations have the effect of either overtly discriminating on the basis of
content, or - as in Citizens United - presents the risk of such
discrimination because it differentiates among speakers, they must be
532 533justified under strict scrutiny, as the Court has taught in other cases.
525. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 908.
526. See id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 899; see also id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 903
(explaining that Bellotti "rested on the principle that the Government lacks the power
to ban corporations from speaking").
527. See id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 889-98.
528. See id.; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976).
529. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at , 130 S. Ct. at 950; see also Buckley,
424 U.S. at 49.
530. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at , 130 S. Ct. at 899.
531. Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
532. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at , 130 S. Ct. at 898.
533. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774-75
(2002) (content regulation is impermissible under the First Amendment unless the
regulation satisfies strict scrutiny); see, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group,
Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (holding that content-based restrictions on speech
were subject to strict scrutiny).
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B. There is no inherent danger in the corporate form.
The second speech-protective principle pronounced by the
Citizens United Court is that the mere presence of the corporate form is
not in itself a corruption interest, nor does it give rise to corruption
justifying regulation of First Amendment activity.534 There simply is no
inherent danger in the corporate form. The Court explained that "[i]f the
First Amendment has any force," it must prohibit the government from
banning "political speech simply because the speaker is an association
that has taken on the corporate form."5 35 The contention that government
may limit the political speech of those who have chosen to incorporate is
a "troubling assertion of brooding governmental power [that] cannot be
reconciled with the confidence and stability in civic discourse that the
First Amendment must secure."536
Far from being dangerous, corporate persons' political speech is
vital to the proper functioning of our democracy.537 Since the corporate
form is non-corrupting, the government may not restrict speech simply
because the speaker is a corporate person, because "the First
Amendment does not allow political speech restrictions based on a
speaker's corporate identity."
539
C. The interest in preventing financial quid pro quo corruption is the
only cognizable interest for restricting speech and association.
Having established that the corporate form does not give rise to a
corruption interest, the Citizens United Court expressly affirmed that the
only constitutionally cognizable interest in restricting political speech
and association is the anticorruption interest, which it defined as
financial, quid pro quo corruption.540 And only large contributions give
534. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 904-08.
535. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 904.
536. Id.
537. Id.
538. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 913.
539. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 903.
540. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 901-02. See also id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 909
(explaining that "[w]hen Buckley identified a sufficiently important governmental
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rise to such corruption.541 Put another way, expenditures made
independently of candidates are, as a matter of law, non-corrupting,
542
regardless of whether they are made by a corporate or natural person.
It is only contributions that can potentially corrupt; and even then, it is
only large contributions that implicate the anticorruption interest.
The Citizens United Court specifically rejected all other
interests, including any interest in suppressing speech on the basis of the
corporate identity of the speaker.543 The Court also rejected Austin's
antidistortion interest,544 which had supported limiting corporate speech
to prevent distortion in elections caused by corporate speech having little
545
public support. The Citizens United Court expressly rejected this
antidistortion interest, calling it an "aberration" of First Amendment
principles.546 The Citizens United Court clarified that "[i]t is irrelevant
for purposes of the First Amendment that corporate funds may 'have
little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's
political ideas."' 5
4 7
The Court also rejected Beaumont's interest 5 48 in protecting
dissenting shareholders.54 9 The Court explained that if shareholders
object to corporate speech and association, they may employ the rules of
corporate governance to address their grievances.550 The government
does not have the power to trample First Amendment freedoms when
other less restrictive methods are available to protect shareholders.
The Court also rejected the interest in preventing influence or
access with candidates, stating bluntly that "[i]ngratiation and access, in
interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was
limited to quidpro quo corruption.").
541. Id. at _, _, 130 S. Ct. at 901, 909.
542. See id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 909-10 (explaining that independent
expenditures, by definition, are separate and disconnected from candidates).
543. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 913. See supra Section IV.B.
544. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990),
overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 876.
545. Citizens United, 558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. at 903-08.
546. Id. at ,130 S. Ct. at 907.
547. Id. at ,130 S. Ct. at 905 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660).
548. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 154 (2003).
549. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at , 130 S. Ct. at 911.
550. Id.
551. Id.
FIR ST A MENDMENT LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 9326
CITIZENS UNITED
any event, are not corruption."55 And the anti-circumvention interest,
upon which Beaumont relied, was undermined by Citizens United's
pronouncement that campaign finance laws are always underinclusive to
the anti-circumvention interest because speakers find ways to circumvent
them. 15
In sum, Citizens United made clear that there is only one
constitutionally cognizable interest in limiting First Amendment political
speech and associational freedoms and that is the interest in curbing the
financial quid pro quo corruption that can arise as a result of large
contributions.55 ' That interest is therefore inapplicable to expenditures
that are not coordinated with candidates because independent spending is
not susceptible to quid pro quos.556 The Citizens United Court therefore
held that "independent expenditures, including those made by
corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of
corruption,,,s5 so they cannot be restricted.
D. Bans on political speech are not permissible remedies.
The fourth speech-protective principle from Citizens United is
that whatever the problem might be that the government seeks to
alleviate by restricting political speech and association, a complete ban
on these activities is not a permissible remedy.559 Thus, even when the
government has an anticorruption interest justifying limiting First
Amendment activity, an outright ban is not tolerable. As the Court
explained, "categorical bans" on speech and association are, by their
nature, "asymmetrical" to the interest in preventing quid pro quo
560
corruption.
552. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 910.
553. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 155.
554. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 912.
555. Id. at _ , 130 S. Ct. at 901, 909.
556. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 908.
557. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 909.
558. Id. at ,130 S. Ct. at 913.
559. Id. at 130 S. Ct. at 911.
560. Id.
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E. PACs cannot speak for their connected corporations.
The theory undergirding Austin, 6 Beaumont,562 and
McConnell 563 was that PACs could speak for corporations, and so laws
banning general-fund corporate speech and association were permissible.
With its fifth speech-protective principle, Citizens United corrected these
erroneous decisions by explaining that PACs do not, and cannot, speak
for corporations. PACs are separate legal entities from their organizing
565
corporations. Thus, it is not possible that a PAC could ever allow a
566
corporation to speak.
The speech-ban challenged in Citizens United was the same one
challenged in Beaumont - 2 U.S.C. § 441b, which prohibits corporate
general-fund expenditures and contributions. It allows, however,
corporations to employ PACs to make expenditures and contributions on
their behalf. The Beaumont Court said that section 441b's prohibition on
corporate general-fund independent expenditures was thus not a ban on
corporate speech because corporations could make contributions through
567their connected PACs. Citizens United expressly rejected this
contention, holding that "[s]ection 441b is a ban on corporate speech
561. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660, overruled by Citizens United v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (stating that "the Act does
not impose an absolute ban on all forms of corporate political spending but permits
corporations to make independent political expenditures through separate segregated
funds").
562. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 163 (2003)
(declaring that "[t]he PAC option allows corporate political participation ").
563. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 203 (2003),
overruled in part by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. _, 130 S.
Ct. 876 (2010) (stating that "[b]ecause corporations can still fund electioneering
communications with PAC money, it is 'simply wrong' to view the provision as a
'complete ban"') (quoting Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162).
564. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. , , 130
S. Ct. 876, 897 (2010).
565. Id.
566. Id.
567. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162-63.
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notwithstanding the fact that a PAC created by a corporation can still
speak."56 8
Even if the PAC option allowed corporations to speak, and the
569Citizens United Court stressed that it does not, the onerous PAC option
is an inadequate vindication of the First Amendment.570 Citizens United
explains that "PACs are burdensome alternatives" that are "expensive to
administer and subject to extensive regulations." 7' They have "onerous
restrictions," and corporations may not be able to establish a PAC
572quickly enough to engage in vital political speech. This fact alone is
constitutionally significant, for in the election context, speakers
frequently decide to speak in reaction to others' speech,573 and there are
often short timeframes during which speech is effective.574 The Citizens
United Court was clear: First Amendment free speech guarantees require
that speakers be allowed to make their own, general-fund independent
expenditures. Laws that force speakers, including corporate speakers,
to employ PACs to speak must therefore be evaluated under strict
-576
scrutiny.
Significantly, the Citizens United Court concluded that the PAC
option is burdensome, onerous, and insufficient to vindicate the First
Amendment with no mention of the federal source-and-amount
limitations on contributions to PACs. "In other words, the other PAC
burdens (registration, recordkeeping, periodic reporting of all receipts
and disbursements, and mandatory organization before speaking) were
sufficient to make PAC burdens onerous and inadequate means of
speech." 57 7 As a result, cases such as Alaska Right to Life Committee v.
568. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 897; see also id. at
130 S. Ct. at 898 (holding that "[s]ection 441b's prohibition on corporate
independent expenditures is thus a ban on speech").
569. Id. at ,130 S. Ct. at 897.
570. Id.
571. Id.
572. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 898.
573. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 895.
574. Id. See also Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551
U.S. 449, 472 (2007) (explaining that much core political speech naturally occurs
near elections).
575. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at , 130 S. Ct. at 913.
576. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 898.
577. Bopp & Coleson, supra note 356, at 59.
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Miles, which said that Alaska's challenged PAC-style requirements
were not onerous but constitutional since they did not impose source-
and-amount restrictions, are "no longer viable." 5 79 Citizens United
indicates that it is not the presence of all possible PAC burdens that
makes the PAC option onerous. Rather, the presence of any of these
burdens infringes free speech. Forcing corporations to select from the
menu of PAC burdens is therefore constitutionally suspect. Laws that do
so must satisfy strict scrutiny.
F. Laws burdening speech are subject to strict scrutiny.
Citizens United's sixth speech-protective principle flows from its
recognition that the First Amendment is "premised on mistrust of
governmental power" and "stands against attempts to disfavor certain
subjects or viewpoints,, 58 0 as well as attempts to "distinguish[] among
different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others."581
Therefore, laws burdening speech must survive strict scrutiny to be
constitutional.582 Strict scrutiny "requires the Government to prove that
the restriction 'furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest.'" 8 3 To satisfy the tailoring requirement, speech
restrictions must employ the least restrictive means to further the
government's compelling interest in the regulation.584
578. 441 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2006).
579. Bopp & Coleson, supra note 356, at 59.
580. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 898.
581. Id.
582. Id.
583. Id. (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551
U.S. 449, 464 (2007)).
584. See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal,
546 U.S. 418, 429 (2006) (requiring that regulations subject to strict scrutiny use the
"least restrictive means" to accomplish the interest); Republican Party of Minn. v.
White, 536 U.S. 765, 775 (2002) (noting that under strict scrutiny, laws must not
"unnecessarily circumscrib[e] protected expression") (quoting Brown v. Harlage,
456 U.S. 45, 54 (1982)).
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G. In the First Amendment context, courts owe no deference to the
remedy government chooses to alleviate problems.
Finally, Citizens United explained that, in the First Amendment
context, courts owe no deference to the remedy the government chooses
to alleviate various problems "because remedies enacted by law . . . must
comply with the First Amendment."585 Put another way, "Congress may
not choose an unconstitutional remedy." 5 86 The courts must therefore
apply constitutional scrutiny to each law properly challenged to ascertain
whether the remedy chosen is constitutionally permissible. In other
words, the government must be put to its proof.
V. CITIZENS UNITED'S IMPLICATIONS FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW:
"MORE SPEECH, NOT LESS, Is THE GOVERNING RULE."
The speech-protective principles that Citizens United announced
have broad implications for campaign finance law, encapsulating what is
perhaps the guiding rationale of Citizens United: "[I]t is our law and our
tradition that more speech, not less, is the governing rule."58  This
section will examine four of the most important implications. First, the
government is constitutionally prohibited from requiring corporations to
employ (or become) PACs in order to speak. Thus, PAC-style
requirements for corporate speech are presumptively unconstitutional,
even when dressed in the language of "disclosure." Second, the
government is constitutionally prohibited from limiting contributions
designated for independent expenditures, as well as contributions to
committees making only independent expenditures.589 Third, strict
scrutiny is the proper level of scrutiny to apply to all limits on political
speech, including limits on contributions. 59 0 Fourth, while the
government may impose limits on corporate contributions to candidates,
585. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at , 130 S. Ct. at 911.
586. Id.
587. Id.
588. See infra Section V.A
589. See infra Section V.B.
590. See infra Section V.C.
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it may not ban them. This leads to the conclusion that Beaumont591
should be reconsidered and overruled.592
A. Citizens United explicitly holds that it is unconstitutional to require
corporations to employ PACs to speak or associate.
Citizens United explicitly ruled that restrictions on corporate
general-fund independent expenditures are unconstitutional.59 3 There is
simply no interest in limiting anyone's independent expenditures,
including those made by corporations. The only interest supporting limits
on First Amendment political speech and association is the interest in
limiting quid pro quo corruption,5 94 and independent expenditures do not
give rise to such corruption.595 Thus, independent expenditures are, as a
596 597
matter of law, non-corrupting and so cannot be restricted.
Citizens United also explicitly held that because PACs cannot
598
speak for corporations, and corporations cannot be required to employ
them to make their independent expenditures.5 99 Corporate persons must
600be allowed to make their own, general-fund independent expenditures.
Therefore, laws requiring corporations to employ PACs to make its
independent expenditures are unconstitutional, as are laws requiring
corporations to register as PACs in order to make such expenditures.
It is difficult to believe that a state would have enacted a law,
after Citizens United, requiring corporations to employ a PAC to make
independent expenditures. Yet that is precisely what Minnesota did. Prior
to Citizens United, Minnesota Statutes section 211B.15(3) banned all
corporate independent expenditures, whether general-fund or made
591.
592.
593.
130 S. Ct. 876,
594.
595.
596.
597.
598.
599.
600.
Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
See infra Section V.D.
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S.
913 (2010).
Id. at __, ,130 S. Ct. at 901, 909.
Id. at ,130 S. Ct. at 909.
Id.
Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 913.
Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 897-98.
Id.
Id. at ,130 S. Ct. at 913.
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through a PAC.6o1 After Citizens United was decided, the Minnesota
Chamber of Commerce challenged this ban in Minnesota Chamber of
Commerce v. Gaertner (Chamber).602 The Chamber court struck the ban,
ruling that Citizens United plainly says that corporations have a First
603Amendment right to make independent expenditures.
Chamber was decided on May 7, 2010.604 On May 27, 2010, the
Minnesota legislature amended their law, 60 purportedly to comply with
606
the Citizens United and Chamber decisions. Amended section
211 B. 15(3) now allows corporations to make independent expenditures,
provided they comply with the requirements in section 10A.607 That
section, meanwhile, prohibits all those making independent expenditures
- including corporations - from making them with general-treasury
608dollars. Instead, all those making independent expenditures in
Minnesota must make them through a PAC-style "political fund."609 Just
like PACs, these separate, segregated funds must appoint a treasurer.610
611 611
They also have the same types of registration, record-keeping,
ongoing reporting (even when there is no activity to report),614 and
dissolution615 requirements as those Citizens United described as
601. Minn. Chamber of Commerce v. Gaertner, 710 F. Supp. 2d 868, 870
(D. Minn. 2010).
602. Id.
603. Id. at 873.
604. Id. at 868.
605. Act of May 27, 2010, ch. 397, 2010 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1560
(West) (2010), available at https://www.revisor.mn.gov/-
data/revisor/law/2010/0/2010-397.pdf.
606. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, _ F. Supp. 2d
2010 WL 3768041, at *3 (D. Minn. 2010) (order denying preliminary
injunction motion).
607. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211 B.15 (3) (West 2011).
608. §§ I A.12 (1), (la) (West 2011).
609. Id.
610. § 1OA.12 (3) (West 2011).
611. § 1OA.14 (West 2011).
612. § 1OA.13 (West 2005).
613. § IOA.20 (West 2011).
614. § 10A.20 (7) (West 2011).
615. § 1OA.24 (West 2005).
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616 617burdensome and onerous. Minnesota's political fund requirement is
thus equivalent to the federal PAC option that Citizens United said was
618inadequate to protect First Amendment rights.
We represented a coalition of both profit and nonprofit
corporations that challenged Minnesota's amended law that subverted
Citizens United by banning corporate general-fund independent
expenditures.619 The State defended its law by asserting that it was not a
ban on corporate speech but merely a disclosure requirement to make
620
certain that all independent expenditures are adequately disclosed. In
spite of Citizens United's clear teaching that corporations cannot be
required to employ PACs to make independent expenditures,621 the
district court denied the corporations' motion for preliminary
622inj unction.
The court implausibly ruled that there were actually two ways
the plaintiffs could make independent expenditures. First, under the
campaign finance board's interpretation of Minnesota law, corporations
are permitted to make general-fund contributions to other independent
expenditure committees to fund those other committees' independent
expenditures.623 The court said that this provision is one way
corporations may make independent expenditures - they may fund
someone else's independent expenditures.624 However, the court's
616. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. , , 130 S.
Ct. 876, 897 (2010).
617. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 898.
618. See id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 897-98.
619. See generally Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson,
F. Supp. 2d , 2010 WL 3768041 (D. Minn. 2010) (order denying preliminary
injunction motion).
620. Id. at _, 2010 WL 3768041 at *10.
621. Citizens United, 558 U.S. , 130 S. Ct. at 913.
622. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, F. Supp. 2d at , 2010 WL
3768041 at *1. This denial of preliminary injunction is currently on appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Minn. Citizens Concerned for
Life, F. Supp. 2d , 2010 WL 3768041, argued, No. 10 - 3126 (8th Cir. Jan. 11,
2011).
623. See MINNESOTA CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
BOARD, Corporate Participation in Minnesota's Political Process (2010),
http://www.cfboard.state.mn.us/campfin/iepcf statutes_2010.pdf.
624. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, _ F. Supp. 2d at _, 2010
WL 3768041 at *3.
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reasoning is flawed. Funding another's speech is not the same as
speaking oneself. What the court is describing is not an independent
expenditure but rather a contribution to an independent expenditure
committee. Allowing the plaintiffs to fund someone else's speech is not
the same as allowing the plaintiffs to fund their own speech, and the
court was wrong to characterize it as such.
The second way the court asserted that the corporate plaintiffs
could make independent expenditures was by forming its own
independent expenditure political fund (i.e., PAC) under Minnesota
law.625 This, however, is the very PAC-option for speech that Citizens
United held unconstitutional. 6 26 The district court disagreed, claiming
that Minnesota's political fund option did not actually require
corporations to form a separate entity627 (as we had asserted in our
briefing). 62 8 Rather, the court said that the political fund "can consist of a
corporate account created for the purpose of the corporation making
independent expenditures or a simple bookkeeping device, such as a
spreadsheet." 62 9
The court's understanding of the regulation, however, does not
rid the law of constitutional problems. It merely trades one constitutional
infirmity for another. In our brief in support of the motion for
preliminary injunction, we argued that Minnesota's corporate
independent expenditure ban actually bans corporate general-fund
independent expenditures, requiring them instead to establish a separate
PAC-style political fund to make their expenditures. This would clearly
violate Citizens United.630 The court posited instead that the law does not
require corporations making independent expenditures to establish a
separate entity because (the court said) a political fund is but a book-
keeping mechanism - a line item in the corporation's ledger. In other
words, a political fund is not separate from the corporation, it is the
corporation. This, though, means that it is the corporation itself that is
required to submit to the PAC-style registration, record-keeping, and
625. Id.
626. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at , , 130 S. Ct. at 897-98, 913.
627. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, F. Supp. 2d at , 2010 WL
3768041 at *8.
628. Id. at _, 2010 WL 3768041 at *7.
629. Id. at , 2010 WL 3768041 at *8.
630. See Citizens United, 558 U. S. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
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reporting requirements imposed on political funds. This in no way solves
the constitutional infirmity of Minnesota's law, for Buckley held that
PAC-status and burdens may only be imposed on those organizations
under the control of a candidate or having Buckley's "major purpose." 631
And even if there might be other organizations for which it would be
proper to impose PAC-status or burdens, the laws imposing such status
. 632
and burdens must survive strict scrutiny not exacting scrutiny as the
63district court applied. Thus, under our understanding of Minnesota's
law, corporations are prohibited from making general-fund independent
expenditures but must employ a PAC to make them. Under the court's
understanding, corporations are allowed to make independent
expenditures but must register as a PAC to make them. Citizens United
forecloses both possibilities - both are unconstitutional.
The court next turned to a consideration of Minnesota's political
634fund requirement, which it held was designed to facilitate disclosure.
The court therefore saw it as "permissible under Citizens United,"6 3 5
which had upheld one-time, "event-driven" disclosures for electioneering
communications and independent expenditures (i.e., reporting
independent expenditures when made and any contributions earmarked
636for express advocacy). Evaluating the PAC requirements under the
637
exacting scrutiny applicable to event-driven disclosure requirements,
instead of the strict scrutiny necessary for PAC requirements that burden
speech,638 the court held that the ban on corporate general-fund
independent expenditures was likely constitutional. In doing so, the
court confused Minnesota's PAC-style disclosure requirements -
631. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79-80 (1976). See supra Section
I.C.L.
632. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S.Ct. at 898. See supra at
Section III.E.
633. Minnesota Citizens Concernedfor Life, 2010 WL 3768041 at *9.
634. Id.
635. Id. (citing Citizens United, 558 U.S. at ,130 S.Ct. at 914).
636. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 914.
637. Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life, 2010 WL 3768041 at *9
(citing Citizens United, 558 U.S. at ,_ S. Ct. at 914).
638. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 898.
639. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, F. Supp. 2d at , 2010 WL
3768041 at *11.
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which Citizens United (1) declared are "burdensome,64o and
"onerous,"64 1 (2) evaluated under strict scrutiny,64 2 and (3) held
unconstitutional as applied to corporations making independent
expenditures643 - with the on-ad and event-driven attribution requirement
that Citizens United upheld under exacting scrutiny. In fact, every
positive statement Citizens United made about disclosure related to on-ad
attribution requirements and simple event-driven reporting of general-
fund independent expenditures. None related to the type of detailed
PAC-style reporting Minnesota requires each reporting period regardless
of whether independent expenditures were made. Nor did the Citizens
United Court have anything positive to say about the PAC-style
registration, record-keeping, and dissolution requirements that Minnesota
imposes on corporations seeking to make independent expenditures. The
district court thus erred in holding that the PAC-style requirements
imposed by Minnesota's law are permissible under Citizens United for
corporations making independent expenditures. They are not.
Regardless of whether Minnesota's requirement is properly
understood as (1) a ban on corporate general-fund independent
expenditures that requires corporations to employ a "political fund" to
make such expenditures or (2) a requirement that corporations making
independent expenditures register themselves as political funds in order
to make their expenditures, the requirement violates the clear holding of
Citizens United. Dressing it up in the language of disclosure, as both the
State and the district court did, does not save it. The plaintiffs we
represent have appealed the district court's denial of preliminary
injunction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.645
The appeal has been fully briefed and argued, and we await the Eighth
Circuit's decision.
640. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at , 130 S. Ct. at 897.
641. Id. at ,130 S. Ct. at 898.
642. Id.
643. Id. at ,130 S. Ct. at 913.
644. Id. at ,130 S. Ct. at 914.
645. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life v. Swanson, F. Supp. 2d,
2010#WL 3768041 (D. Minn. 2010), argued, No. 10-3126 (8th Cir. Jan. 11, 2010).
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B. Citizens United necessarily means that it is unconstitutional to limit
contributions to committees making independent expenditures.
Citizens United held that independent expenditures do not give
rise to corruption.646 This necessarily means that contributions earmarked
for independent expenditures, or donated to committees making only
independent expenditures, cannot give rise to corruption. If the
expenditures are not susceptible to creating financial quid pro quo
corruption, then the contributions used to fund such expenditures must be
non-corrupting too. Limits on these contributions must therefore be
unconstitutional. One of our cases, Thalheimer v. City of San Diego,64 7
illustrates this principle. It was the first case to extend Citizen United's
holding to limits on contributions made to independent expenditure
committees.64 8
One of the plaintiffs in Thalheimer was an independent
expenditure committee that wanted to receive unlimited contributions for
649its independent expenditures. San Diego law, however, required any
expenditure made to be attributable to the contributions of individuals, in
amounts totaling no more than $500 per individual.6so This amounted to
a de facto contribution limit of $500 per natural person and a ban on
contributions from corporations and other associations.6 Because the
law limited contributions, rather than expenditures, the Thalheimer court
applied the less rigorous, "closely drawn" scrutiny that has frequently
been used to evaluate contribution limits, requiring that the limit be
"closely drawn" to a "sufficiently important interest." 652 Following
646. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 909.
647. Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 706 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (S.D. Cal.
2010) (order granting in part and denying in part a motion for summary judgment).
648. An earlier Fourth Circuit case, North Carolina Right to Life v. Leake,
had anticipated Citizens United when it held in 2008 that it was implausible that
contributions to independent expenditure committees are corrupting. N.C. Right to
Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 293 (4th Cir. 2008). However, the Thalheimer
case was the first to extend Citizens United's reasoning to the context of
contributions to independent expenditure committees.
649. Thalheimer, 706 F. Supp. 2d at 1070.
650. Id. at 1074.
651. Id. at 1074, 1075 n.8.
652. Id. at 1075.
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Citizens United, the court should have applied strict scrutiny.
Regardless, the court held that there was no interest in limiting
contributions to independent expenditure committees and so the limit
must fail even "closely drawn" scrutiny: "Given the Supreme Court's
consistent treatment of independent expenditures, it is implausible that
limiting the amount of money that committees can use to make
independent expenditures furthers an anticorruption interest."654 The
court held that the plaintiffs were therefore likely to succeed on the
merits of their challenge.655
Shortly after Thalheimer was decided, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in Long Beach Area
656Chamber of Commerce v. Long Beach, a case that likewise concerned
the constitutionality of limits on contributions to independent
expenditure committees. In dicta, the Long Beach court suggested that
Citizens United indicates that strict scrutiny, rather than "closely drawn"
scrutiny, is the appropriate level of scrutiny for contribution limits.658
The court said:
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court stated: "[P]olitical
speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it,
whether by design or inadvertence. Laws that burden
political speech are 'subject to strict scrutiny."' It is
unclear whether this unqualified statement is the death
knell for closely drawn scrutiny or whether it was
intended only to reaffirm the long standing principle that
expenditure limitations, like those at issue in Citizens
659United, are subject to strict scrutiny.
653. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. , , 130 S.
Ct. 876, 898 (2010). See infra Section IV.C.
654. Thalheimer, 706 F.Supp.2d at 1076.
655. Id. at 1078. The City of San Diego appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, Nos. 10-
55322, 10-55324, 10-55434 (9th Cir. argued Oct. 4,2010).
656. Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. Long Beach, 603 F.3d
684 (9th Cir. 2010).
657. Id. at 687.
658. Id. at 692 n.4. See also infra Section IV.C.
659. Id. at 692 n.4 (citations omitted) (quoting Citizens United v. Fed
Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. _, _, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010)).
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The Long Beach court did not determine the applicable level of
scrutiny, however, because like the Thalheimer court, it held that there
was no interest that could constitutionally justify limits on contributions
made to independent expenditure committees.660 Therefore, the court
held the limit unconstitutional no matter which level of scrutiny was
applied. 6 6 1
Similarly employing the Citizens United rationale, the D.C.
662
Circuit held in SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission that
there is no anticorruption interest in limiting contributions to independent
663 664
expenditure committees. These three cases, Thalheimer, Long
665 666Beach, and SpeechNow, along with the pre-Citizens United case
North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake,667 have demonstrated the
necessary conclusion of Citizens United's holding that independent
668
expenditures are non-corrupting and so may not be limited.
Contributions that fund the non-corrupting expenditures must likewise be
non-corrupting. And just like the expenditures, they may not
constitutionally be limited.
C. Contribution limits burden speech and therefore must be evaluated
under strict scrutiny.
The Long Beach court asked whether Citizens United's rule that
laws that burden speech be evaluated under strict scrutiny was the "death
knell" for the "closely drawn" scrutiny that has traditionally been used to
660. Long Beach, 603 F. 3d. at 698.
661. Id. at 692 n.4, 693.
662. SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (en banc).
663. Id. at 695.
664. Thalheimer v. San Diego, 706 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (S.D. Cal. 2010)
(order granting in part and denying in part a motion for summary judgment).
665. Long Beach, 603 F.3d at 684.
666. SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d 686.
667. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 293 (4th Cir. 2008)
(finding it implausible that contributions to independent expenditure committees are
corrupting).
668. Citizens United v. Fed Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. , , 130 S.
Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
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evaluate contribution limits.669 Long Beach did not answer the question
because the answer was not necessary for the disposition of the case
before it.670 However, the answer is "Yes." After Citizens United,
contribution limits must satisfy strict scrutiny. They burden speech, and
Citizens United held: "Laws that burden political speech are 'subject to
strict scrutiny,' which requires the Government to prove that the
restriction 'furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest."'
67 1
1. Contributions are political speech.
It has sometimes been suggested that contributions do not
become "speech" until the candidate or committee spends the money for
expressive purposes. This follows from a misunderstanding of Buckley v.
S672Valeo' s teaching that "the transformation of contributions into
political debate involves speech by someone other than the
contributor."673 However, Buckley does not say that contributions have
no speech value at the moment contributors make them; rather, it says
the opposite. In fact, the Supreme Court has consistently held that
making a contribution is both an act associating contributors with the
ones contributed to and also an expressive act in which contributors
speak by means of making the contribution.
The Buckley Court explained that the act of making contributions
has speech value. A contribution communicates a "general expression of
674
support," which means that the contribution itself is speech. Limits on
contributions are thus "marginal restriction[s] upon the contributor's
,,675
ability to engage in free communication. Contributions are therefore
669. Long Beach, 603 F.3d at 692 n.4.
670. Id. at 692-93.
671. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 898 (quoting Fed
Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)).
672. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
673. Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
674. Id. at 21. See also id. ("The quantity of communication [i.e., speech]
by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution,
since the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of
contributing.").
675. Id. at 20. See also id. at 21 (noting that a contribution limit "involves
little direct restraint on his political communication [i.e., speech], for it permits the
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the contributors' speech. True, they are transformed into "political
debate" by someone else. But contributions are the contributors' speech,
communicating that they support the candidates or committees to whom
the contributions are made. The Court reaffirmed that contributions are
speech in the next contribution limit case it considered, Citizens Against
Rent Control v. Berkeley, 676 when the Court noted that contributions are
"a very significant form of political expression." 6 77
The Court again acknowledged the speech-component of
contributions in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PA C,678 when it
noted that speech "suffered little direct effect from contribution
limits."679 Citing many of Buckley's numerous statements that
contributions are speech, so the Court explained that "limiting
contributions left communication significantly unimpaired." 6 8 1 The Court
then noted that contribution limits "bore more heavily on the
associational right than on freedom to speak," so "a contribution
limitation surviving a claim of associational abridgment would survive a
,682
speech challenge as well."
The Court's statement that speech "suffered little direct effect"6 83
does not mean it suffered no direct effect but implies that speech suffers
some direct effect through limits on contributions. Similarly, saying that
speech was left "significantly unimpaired" by contribution limits684 does
not mean speech was not impaired at all but implies that some
impairment of speech occurs when contributions are limited. And
recognizing that contribution limits burden associational rights more than
speech rights' does not mean that speech rights are unburdened by
contribution limits. Nixon thus reaffirmed that limits on contributions
burden speech because making a contribution is an expressive activity.
symbolic expression [i.e., speech] of support evidenced by a contribution but does
not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues").
676. Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
677. Id. at 298.
678. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
679. Id. at 386 (emphasis added).
680. Id. at 386-87.
681. Id. at 387.
682. Id. at 388.
683. Id. at 386.
684. Id. at 387.
685. Id. at 388.
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The Court again explained that contributions involve speech
when it noted in Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican
Federal Campaign Committee686 that "[r]estraints on expenditures
generally curb more expressive and associational activity than limits on
contributions do."687 This necessarily implies that limits on contributions
curb some expressive [i.e., speech] rights.
The Court again called contributions "speech" in Federal
Election Commission v. Beaumont688 when it noted that "contributions lie
closer to the edges than to the core of political expression [i.e.,
speech]."689 That contributions "lie closer to the edges than to the core of
political expression" does not mean that they lie outside speech but that
they are included within the category of expressive activity.
In McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 69 the Court
691
quoted much of the language cited above from its previous cases, then
noted that the "communicative value" of contributions "inheres mainly in
their ability to facilitate the speech of their recipients." 69 2 But to say that
contributions' "communicative value" lies "mainly" in the fact that
recipients turn contributions into speech does not mean that the
communicative value lies solely in that function. Rather, it indicates that
some communicative value lies in the contributor's act of making the
contribution.
The Court again affirmed that contributions are speech in
another of our cases, Randall v. Sorrell,693 when it explained that
"contribution limits, like expenditure limits, 'implicate fundamental First
Amendment interests,' namely, the freedoms of 'political expression'
[i.e., speech] and 'political association."'694
686. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm.,
533 U.S. 431 (2001).
687. Id. at 440.
688. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
689. Id. at 148.
690. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003),
overruled in part by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. ,
130 S. Ct 876 (2010).
691. Id. at 134-37.
692. Id. at 135 (emphasis added).
693. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
694. Id. at 246 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)).
Thus, while "contribution limits burden associational rights more
than speech rights,"6 95 the Supreme Court has consistently held that the
act of making a contribution is itself speech. It may be "symbolic"
speech,696 "le closer to the edges than to the core of political
expression," 697 and be but a "general expression of support" for the
698
candidate or committee, but it is political speech nonetheless.
2. "Laws imposing burdens on political speech must be evaulated
under strict scrutiny."
Citizens United reminds us that "[t]he First Amendment 'has its
fullest and most urgent application' to speech uttered during a campaign
for political office."6 99 Also, "[p]olitical speech must prevail against laws
that would suppress it, whether by design or inadvertence. 700 Therefore,
laws imposing burdens on political speech must be evaluated under strict
scrutiny.701 This requires the government to prove that its law is narrowly
tailored to a compelling interest. 70 2
The Long Beach Court correctly suspected that this strict
scrutiny requirement for laws burdening "speech" is the "death knell" for
the lesser, "closely drawn" scrutiny under which contribution limits have
703frequently been evaluated. Had the Citizens United Court meant to say
that laws burdening "expenditures" must be evaluated under strict
scrutiny, it would have done so. That it chose to say that laws burdening
"speech" are so evaluated is constitutionally significant. The Court's rule
is determinative for the proper level of scrutiny to apply to contribution
limits because contributions are speech, and contribution limits therefore
695. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388 (2000).
696. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
697. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161 (2003).
698. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
699. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. , , 130
S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) (quoting Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm.,
489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989)).
700. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at , 130 S. Ct. at 898.
701. Id.
702. Id.
703. Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. Long Beach, 603
F.3d 684, 692 n.4 (9th Cir. 2010).
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burden speech. Citizens United was, indeed, "a game changer,"7 04
requiring courts to employ strict scrutiny to limits on contributions.
At least one district court has done so. In Family PAC v. Reed,70 5
a case in which we represent the plaintiffs, the court applied Citizens
United, evaluated a contribution limit under strict scrutiny, and declared
it unconstitutional. The Family PAC case involved a challenge by Family
PAC, a ballot measure committee, to a law limiting contributions during
706
the final days before an election. The court ruled that the contribution
limit was actually a ban on speech because it banned any contributions
[i.e., speech] above the limit.707 Applying strict scrutiny, the court found
that, while there was a compelling interest supporting the limit, 70 it was
not narrowly tailored to the interest as applied to the plaintiffs. 709 The
court therefore granted summary judgment, declaring that the
contribution limit was unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs. 710
The Family PAC court correctly understood the implications of
Citizens United: contribution limits are burdens on speech and must be
evaluated under strict scrutiny. This requires the government to first
prove that an interest in limiting contributions exists.' Citizens United
left only one constitutionally cognizable interest - the interest in
preventing quid pro quo corruption associated with large
contributions.7 12 The court cannot assume that there is an interest in
704. Transcript of Proceedings at 39, Family PAC v. Reed, No. C09-
5662RBL (W.D. Wash. Sept. 1, 2010).
705. Family PAC v. Reed, No. C09-5662RBL (W.D. Wash. Sept. 1,
2010) (order granting in part summary judgment motion).
706. Transcript of Proceedings at 43, Family PAC v. Reed, No. C09-
5662RBL (W.D. Wash. Sept. 1, 2010).
707. Id. at 44-45.
708. The court did not find an anticorruption interest supporting the limit
but rather found that an information interest was compelling enough to justify
limiting contributions. Citizens United was clear: the only interest that can
justify limiting contributions is the anticorruption interest. Citizens United v.
Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. _, _ , _, 130 S. Ct. 876, 901, 909 (2010).
709. Transcript of Proceedings at 43, Family PAC v. Reed, No. C09-
5662RBL (W.D. Wash. Sept. 1, 2010).
710. Id. at 48.
711. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 898.
712. Id. at _, _, 130 S. Ct. at 901, 909. See also id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at
903-08 (rejecting all other interests in limiting First Amendment political speech
and association).
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limiting contributions but rather must require that the government prove
a real or apparent corruption problem that their law is designed to
curb.7 13 Finding an anticorruption interest in the absence of proof is
714
reversible error.
If the government is not able to establish an anticorruption
interest in its contribution limit, the limit must fail as unconstitutional,
for under strict scrutiny, limits are only constitutional if there is a
compelling interest that justifies it. If the government proves an
interest, then the court must ask whether the law is "narrowly tailored" to
that interest, employing the least restrictive means to ensure that it
burdens no more speech than absolutely necessary to further its
716.interest. Only contribution limits passing such strict scrutiny are
constitutional; all others must fail. 7 17
713. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464
(2007) ("Under strict scrutiny, the Government must prove that applying BCRA
to WRTL's ads furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve
that interest."); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-88 (2000)
(finding that the government bears the burden of proving its interest in
contribution limits). See also Citizens for Clean Gov't v. City of San Diego, 474
F.3d 647, 653 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding in contribution limit challenge that it is
reversible error for a district court to find an anticorruption interest where the
government has not presented evidence of such); Daggett v. Comm'n on Gov'tal
Ethics and Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445, 455 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that
the court must "first consider whether there is sufficient evidentiary support of
the threat of corruption or its appearance" to justify limits on contributions);
Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 919 (6th Cir. 1998) (affirming district
court decision to invalidate campaign finance ordinance because government
failed to prove an interest in its regulation); Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d
1544, 1553 (8th Cir. 1996) (ruling that campaign finance laws will only be
upheld if government can show that law furthers its interest and is properly
tailored).
714. Citizens for Clean Gov 't, 474 F.3d at 653 (holding in contribution
limit challenge that it is reversible error for a district court to find an
anticorruption interest where the government has not presented evidence of
such).
715. Citizens United at 558 U.S. _, , 130 S. Ct. at 913 (ruling the
independent expenditure ban unconstitutional because "no sufficient
governmental interest justifies" it).
716. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775 (2002)
(holding that under strict scrutiny, laws must not "unnecessarily circumscribe
protected expression").
717. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at , ,130 S. Ct. at 898, 913.
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3. While contribution limits may be permissible, bans are not.
As courts evaluate contribution limits, it is important that they
recall that Citizens United declared that bans on speech are
718impermissible. Although the Citizens United Court did not anchor this
principle in Buckley, it follows from that Court's teaching that
contribution limits are permissible precisely because a limit still allows
for association,719 as well as expression of support for the candidate or
committee.720 Thus, a ban on contributions, which precluded all
association and expression, would not be permissible.
Even Beaumont recognized this. Although that Court upheld a
requirement that corporations make contributions through PACs,72 1
which Citizens United explained is actually a ban on corporate First
Amendment activity,722 the Beaumont Court stated that the PAC option
left an avenue for corporate contributions.723 This is evident from the
Beaumont Court's statement that the PAC option "permits some
participation of unions and corporations in the federal electoral process.
,,724
Thus, while limits on contributions may be acceptable, so long as
they satisfy strict scrutiny, bans are never permissible. Our Minnesota
725Citizens Concerned for Life case illustrates this perfectly. Minnesota's
law does not allow corporations to form PAC-style political funds for
making contributions through which the connected organization
exercises control by determining what contributions are made and to
718. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 911.
719. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976) ("The Act's contribution
ceilings thus limit one important means of associating with a candidate or
committee, but leave the contributor free to become a member of any political
association and to assist personally in the association's efforts on behalf of
candidates.").
720. Id. at 21.
721. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 163 (2003).
722. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. , , 130 S.
Ct. 876, 897 (2010).
723. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162-63.
724. Id. at 162.
725. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, F. Supp. 2d
,2010 WL 3768041 (D. Minn. 2010) (order denying preliminary injunction
motion).
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whom.726 This is because Minnesota law bans corporations from making
contributions, so they are not allowed to exercise any control over
contributions.727 Therefore, if corporations want to create a PAC-style
fund for their employees to donate to and from which to make
contributions, they are required to create what Minnesota law calls a
"conduit fund." 7 28 The connected corporations are prohibited from
729
exercising any control over their conduit funds' contributions. Instead,
employees making contributions to corporations' conduit funds must
earmark for whom their contributions are made. 73 0 The conduit fund
must disburse contributions as the employee-donors - not the
corporations - designate. 731 Thus, corporations are left with no way to
make contributions to candidates and parties they want to support.
Even if Beaumont is still good law, Minnesota's corporate
contribution ban runs afoul of it. Buckley, Beaumont, and Citizens United
all require that contribution restrictions leave room for some level of
contributions. Laws that do not, but rather ban contributions entirely are
impermissible.
D. Citizens United's holding and reasoning demands that Beaumont be
reconsidered and overruled
Stare decisis dictates that precedent is to be respected and
followed. However, the rule is not absolute. As the Supreme Court
explained in Citizens United, "Beyond workability, the relevant factors
in deciding whether to adhere to the principle of stare decisis include the
antiquity of the precedent, the reliance interests at stake, and of course
whether the decision was well reasoned."732 The Citizens United Court
explained that "[t]hese considerations counsel in favor of rejecting
726. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.12 (1) (West 2011).
727. § 211B.15 (2) (West 2011), invalidated by Minn. Chamber of
Commerce v. Gaertner, 710 F. Supp. 2d 868 (2010); § 211B.15 (4).
728. § 211B.15 (16).
729. Id.
730. Id.
731. Id.
732. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. , , 130 S.
Ct. 876, 912 (2010) (quoting Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. , 129 S.
Ct. 2079, 2088-89 (2009)).
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Austin, which itself contravened this Court's earlier precedents in
Buckley and Bellotti."7 33
Similarly, these considerations lead to the conclusion that
Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont,734 which upheld the federal
ban on corporate general-fund contributions, should be reconsidered and
overruled. It, too, "contravened this Court's earlier precedents in Buckley
and Bellotti." And, like Austin, it has the relevant factors counseling in
favor of reconsideration and overruling. Beaumont is not ancient, having
been decided in 2003. The "reliance interests at stake" favor overruling
it, since doing so will not harm the government that seeks to ban
corporate speech. Instead, it will (1) restore to corporate persons their
First Amendment right to political speech and association; (2) benefit the
electorate by increasing the potential for informative speech about
candidates and issues; and (3) further "our law and our tradition that
more speech, not less, is the governing rule." And finally, the
Beaumont decision was not well-reasoned. In fact, its reasoning was
horribly flawed. That was evident even at the time it was decided."' And
it is undeniable now, in the wake of the holding and reasoning of Citizens
United,7 37 both of which demand that Beaumont be reconsidered and
overruled.
1. Citizen United's holding demands that Beaumont be reconsidered
and overruled.
With regard to whether the government could ban corporate
independent expenditures by requiring those corporations wishing to
make expenditures to employ a PAC to do so, the Citizens United Court
held:
We return to the principle established in Buckley
and Bellotti that the Government may not suppress
political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate
identity. No sufficient governmental interest justifies
733. Id.
734. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
735. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 911.
736. See supra Section II.D.4.
737. See infra Section V.D.2.
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limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit
corporation . . .. Section 441b's restrictions on corporate
independent expenditures are therefore invalid.m
The Court explained that this holding necessitated the overruling
of Austin, which had restricted political speech on the basis of the
corporate identity of the speaker. 73 9 This holding also necessitates the
reconsideration and overruling of Beaumont,7 4 0 which likewise used the
corporate identity rationale to justify upholding Section 441b's ban on
corporate general-fund contributions. 74 1 That rationale is not
constitutionally permissible. "[T]he Government may not suppress
political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity."742
Because Beaumontallowed the government to do precisely that, its
decision should be reconsidered and overturned.
2. Citizens United's reasoning demands that Beaumont be reconsidered
and overruled
The speech-protective principles that Citizens United
announced7 43 also call for a reconsideration of Beaumont.744 The
Beaumont Court's reasoning stands in stark contrast to each of these
principles.
a. Beaumont impermissibly allowed the government to discriminate
among speakers.
Citizens United affirmed that the government is constitutionally
prohibited from discriminating among speakers, allowing speech by the
ones it prefers while restricting the speech of disfavored speakers.7 45 Yet,
738. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
739. Id.
740. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
741. See id. at 152-63.
742. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at , 130 S. Ct. at 913.
743. See supra Section IV.
744. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 146
745. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at , 130 S. Ct. at 898 (explaining that
the government is constitutionally prohibited from "distinguishing among
different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others"). See also supra
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that is precisely what Beaumont allowed. The Court explained "[a]ny
attack on the federal prohibition of direct corporate political
contributions goes against the current of a century of congressional
efforts to curb corporations' potentially 'deleterious influences on federal
election."746 The ban "grew out of a popular feeling in the late 19th
century that aggregated capital unduly influenced politics." 74 7 There was
no evidence of corruption - there was just a "popular feeling" that
corporate contributions had "potentially deleterious influences."
Corporations were thus judged to be bad, and their political speech and
association was curbed. Individual persons could make contributions
because they were the favored speakers. As the Court explained, "[a] ban
on direct corporate contributions leaves individual members of
corporations free to make their own contributions"74 8 The ban on
corporate contributions was therefore acceptable to the Beaumont Court
because the favored speakers were allowed to speak, and the disfavored
ones were silenced.
Citizens United dictates that this type of governmental
censorship of disfavored speakers is constitutionally impermissible.
There is "no basis" for the proposition that government "may impose
restrictions on certain disfavored speakers. The Court explained that
doing so impermissibly deprives the disfavored speaker the opportunity
"to establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker's voice., 750 The
First Amendment will not tolerate this.75 Because Beaumont allowed
what the First Amendment forbids, it should be reconsidered and
overruled.
Section III.A (quoting United States v. United Auto Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 585
(1957).
746. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 152 (quotation omitted).
747. Id.
748. Id. at 162 n.8.
749. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 899.
750. Id.
751. Id.
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b. Beaumont impermissibly found a corruption interest in the corporate
form.
Citizens United explained that there is no inherent danger in the
corporate form when it ruled that "the First Amendment does not allow
political speech restrictions based on a speaker's corporate identity."75 2
Indeed, "government lacks the power to ban corporations from
speaking." To restrict any speech, including corporate speech,
government must have some constitutionally cognizable interest in doing
so. "Corporate identity" cannot provide that interest. In fact, the only
constitutionally cognizable interest in restricting contributions is the
interest in preventing the type of financial quid pro quo corruption that
can arise as a result of large contributions.754 But that anticorruption
interest is not implicated by independent expenditures. So, the Court
ruled, because there is no cognizable interest in restricting independent
755
expenditures, Citizens United's corporate identity could not supply an
756interest in restricting its independent expenditures.
The Beaumont Court, on the other hand, found a danger inherent
in the corporate form. It spoke of the "special characteristics of the
corporate structure that threaten the integrity of the political process."757
It worried that the corporate form granted corporations "an unfair
758
advantage" for their political speech. This was even true for nonprofit
advocacy corporations - the very fact that they had taken on the
752. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 903. See also id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 913
("The First Amendment does not permit Congress to make these categorical
distinctions based on the corporate identity of the speaker and the content of the
political speech."). See also supra Section I1I.B.
753. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 903.
754. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 909 ("When Buckley identified a sufficiently
important governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of
corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption."). See also id. at
, 130 S. Ct. at 901 (explaining that Buckley's recognition of the
anticorruption interest "followed from the Court's concern that large
contributions could be given 'to secure a political quid pro quo') (quoting
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)). See also supra Section IV.C.
755. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 909.
756. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 913.
757. Fed Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 153 (2003).
758. Id. at 154.
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corporate form made their speech potentially dangerous.7 5 9 Corporate
general-fund contributions posed "risks of harm" merely because they
were made by those having chosen to incorporate.760
Citizens United stands for the proposition that the government
may not discriminate among speakers, allowing speech by some and not
others because there is no risk of corruption inherent in the corporate
form. Beaumont, on the other hand, stands for the proposition that the
government may allow contributions by some and not others because
there is danger in the corporate form. Beaumont's reasoning is therefore
flawed. It stands to be reconsidered and overruled.
c. Beaumont impermissibly ruled that corporations could speak and
associate through their PACs.
Citizens United was unequivocal: corporations and their
connected PACs are separate legal entities, so a PAC cannot speak for a
corporation.761 The Citizens United Court declared that section 441b's
prohibition on corporate general-fund speech and association is therefore
a ban on corporate speech and association, notwithstanding the fact that
762PACs created by corporations may speak and associate.
The Beaumont Court held the exact opposite. Considering the
same statute - section 441b - it said that it is "simply wrong" to
characterize the ban on corporate general-fund contributions as a
"complete ban" because "the section 'permits some participation of
unions and corporations in the federal electoral process by allowing them
to establish' . . . PACs."7 63 The Court wrongly held that "[t]he PAC
option allows corporate political participation." 7  But this cannot be
right, for speech by PACs is not speech by their connected corporations.
They are separate legal entities; one cannot speak for the other. Thus, as
the Citizens United Court ruled, "Section 441b is a ban on corporate
speech notwithstanding the fact that a PAC created by a corporation can
759. Id. at 159-60.
760. Id. at 159.
761. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 897.
762. Id.
763. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162-63 (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v.
Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 201 (1982)).
764. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 163.
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still speak."765 And, as the Citizens United Court further stated, "An
outright ban on corporate political speech during the critical preelection
period is not a permissible remedy."766 The government may have an
interest in limiting corporate contributions, as it has limited individual
contributions, but it may not ban them.
The Buckley Court taught this principle when it explained that
contribution limits were constitutionally acceptable, provided there was
an interest in the limit and the law was properly tailored, precisely
because limits still permit "the symbolic expression of support evidenced
by a contribution., 7 67 Thus, the expressive - that is, the speech - value
of a contribution remained, even if the amount the contributor could give
was limited. Further, a limit on contributions allowed association to take
place, for "[m]aking a contribution, like joining a political party, serves
to affiliate a person with a candidate. 768 Even if the contributor could
not give as much as she liked, she could still give, so she could still
express her support and associate with the candidate of her choice. A ban
on contributions, however, allows neither speech nor association to take
place. It therefore offends the First Amendment.
The Beaumont Court seemed to agree, taking great pains to
(wrongly) explain that by allowing corporations to form PACs, section
769441b did not actually ban corporate contributions. It further stated that
if North Carolina Right to Life could show that requiring it to make
contributions through PACs was impermissible under the First
Amendment, then the ban on corporate general-fund contributions would
be unconstitutional.770 That showing has now been recognized by the
Citizens United Court.7 7 1 The PAC option does not allow corporations to
engage in protected First Amendment activity.77 2 Rather, it bans speech
and association, in violation of the clear teaching of Buckley and Citizens
765. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at , 130 S. Ct. at 897.
766. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 911; See also supra Section IV.D.
767. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976).
768. Id. at 22.
769. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 163.
770. Id.
771. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. , _, 130 S.
Ct. 876, 897 (2010).
772. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 897-98.
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United that such bans are unacceptable. Beaumont's holding to the
contrary demands that it be reconsidered and overruled.
d. Beaumontfailed to apply strict scrutiny to the corporate contribution
ban.
The Citizens United Court held that because "political speech
must prevail against laws that would suppress it.... Laws that burden
political speech 'are subject to strict scrutiny.' 7 As explained earlier,774
contributions are speech. So laws limiting contributions are burdens on
speech. As such, they must be subjected to strict scrutiny.
The Beaumont Court expressly declined to apply strict scrutiny
to the contribution ban. Instead, it employed a level of scrutiny it
described as "relatively complaisant" 775 and the "lesser demand of being
'closely drawn to match a sufficiently important interest'."776 The Court
explained that it owed "deference" to "legislative judgments on what to
do about" the problem of corporate contributions.777 Citizens United,
though, explains that in the First Amendment context, deference is owed
only to legislative judgments where there is a problem to be remedied.
No deference is owed to the remedy that the government chooses.
Rather, the Court must determine that the remedy is a constitutional
one. 77 8 The Beaumont Court failed to appreciate this requirement,
showed absolute deference, applied the wrong scrutiny, and so arrived at
the wrong decision.
Justice Thomas wrote in dissent: "I continue to believe that
campaign finance laws are subject to strict scrutiny."779 Citizens United
773. Id. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 898 (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis.
Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)).
774. See supra Section IV.C. 1.
775. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 161.
776. Id. at 162 (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,
387-88 (1999)).
777. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162.
778. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 911.
779. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 164 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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clarifies that Justice Thomas was right. Beaumont should therefore be
781
reconsidered and overruled under strict scrutiny.
3. Citizens United's rejection of the interests Beaumont relied upon
demands that Beaumont be reconsidered and overruled.
In addition, the Beaumont Court said that the government
advanced four interests that were sufficiently important to support the
ban on corporate general-fund contributions. Citizens United invalidated
three of those interests and discredited the fourth. Thus, the Beaumont
decision now has no adequate interests to support it. It should therefore
be reconsidered and overruled.
a. Beaumont relied upon the antidistortion interest, which Citizens
United invalidated.
Beaumont identified an interest in preventing the distortion to
elections that might occur by allowing corporations to fund their own
782
speech. The theory, first suggested by MCFL and adopted by the
Austin Court, was that corporations can "use 'resources amassed in the
economic marketplace' to obtain 'an unfair advantage in the political
marketplace."'783 The Austin Court relied upon this interest when it
784
upheld Michigan's law banning corporate independent expenditures. It
explained that the antidistortion interest was aimed at the "corrosive and
distorting effects" of corporate wealth having "little or no correlation to
the public's support for the corporation's political ideas." The
Beaumont Court similarly relied upon the antidistortion interest when it
780. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 898.
781. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 164-65 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining
that section 44 1b's contribution ban could not survive strict scrutiny).
782. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 154.
783. Id. (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652,
658-59 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S.
,130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)).
784. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660, overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 558 U.S. , 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
785 Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
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upheld section 441b's federal ban on corporate independent
expenditures.786
787Citizens United invalidated this interest. The Citizens United
Court explained that the antidistortion theory was horribly mistaken and
constitutionally impermissible for four reasons. First, it rested on an
incorrect premise that it is constitutionally significant whether there is
public support for corporate speech. It is not. Rather, "[i]t is irrelevant
for purposes of the First Amendment that corporate funds may 'have
little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's
political ideas'."
Second, the antidistortion rationale penalized only corporate
speakers for amassing money in the economic marketplace by restricting
their speech, even though all speakers use money amassed in the
economic marketplace to engage in political speech. "The First
Amendment protects the resulting speech, even if it was enabled by
economic transactions with persons or entities who disagree with the
speaker's ideas."7 89
Third, the antidistortion rationale would allow the government to
790ban the speech of media corporations. The Court recognized this as
"dangerous" and "unacceptable."791 Although section 441b exempted
media corporations, they too could use the advantages of the corporate
form to accumulate wealth in the economic marketplace then engage in
speech having little public support.792 The antidistortion rationale, if it
were constitutionally viable, would thereby allow the government to ban
political speech by the institutional press and other media corporations.
As the Court expressed, "There is no precedent for permitting this under
the First Amendment." 7 93 Indeed, the First Amendment commands
otherwise: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press.' 794
786. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 154, 160.
787. Citizens United, 558 U.S. _, _, 130 S. Ct. 876, 903-08 (2010).
788. Id. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 905 (quotin Austin, 494 U.S. at 660).
789. Id.
790. Id.
791. Id.
792. Id.
793. Id.
794. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
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Fourth, the purported purpose for the antidistortion rationale was
795
to restrict large corporate political war chests. Yet, as the Citizens
United Court pointed out, the vast majority of corporations "are small
,,796
corporations without large amounts of wealth. Thus, the antidistortion
rationale "is not even aimed at amassed wealth."7 97 Further, it does
nothing to restrict amassed wealth of individuals and non-incorporated
associations, even though that wealth is also earned in the economic
marketplace and may be used to generate political speech having little
public support. 79 8
The real purpose of the antidistortion rationale was not to
prevent corporate wealth from distorting elections but to prevent
corporate persons from exercising their First Amendment rights.7 99 The
Court concluded that this made the antidistortion interest an "aberration"
of its First Amendment jurisprudence. 00
The Citizens United Court was emphatic: "If the First
Amendment has any force, it prohibits Congress from fining or jailing
citizens, or associations of citizens, for simply engaging in political
speech."80 Yet, that was what the antidistortion rationale allowed. It
permitted the government to restrict political speech by incorporated
associations for no other reason than that it had chosen to take on the
corporate form.802 Such governmental power was not reconcilable with
the First Amendment.803 The antidistortion interest was therefore
constitutionally invalid804 and so could not support section 441b's ban on
corporate independent expenditures. 05
795. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990),
overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct.
876 (2010); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
796. Citizens United, 558 U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. at 907.
797. Id.
798. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 908.
799. Id. at ,130 S. Ct. at 907.
800. Id.
801. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 904.
802. Id.
803. Id.
804. Id.
805. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 904-08.
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The Beaumont Court relied upon this same antidistortion interest
to uphold section 441b's ban on corporate contributions.806 In the wake
of Citizens United, the interest is no longer valid and cannot support the
corporate contribution ban.
b. Beaumont relied upon the shareholder protection interest, which
Citizens United invalidated.
The second interest the Beaumont Court relied upon to uphold
section 441b's ban on corporate general-fund contributions was the
interest in protecting dissenting shareholders from having their
investments used to fund contributions with which they disagree.80 The
Citizens United Court invalidated this interest for two reasons.
First, the "protect dissenting shareholders rationale" was similar
to the antidistortion rationale in that it would allow the government to
ban speech by media corporations. The First Amendment simply does
not allow that.809 Second, the "'procedures of corporate democracy'"
provide all the protection that shareholders need.e8o The dissenting
shareholders rationale is therefore an invalid interest for restricting First
Amendment activity and could not be used to support section 441 b's ban
on corporate independent expenditures.
The Beaumont Court relied upon this interest to uphold section
441b's ban on corporate contributions. In the wake of Citizens United,
the interest is no longer valid and cannot support the corporate
contribution ban.
c. Beaumont relied upon anti-influence interest, which Citizens United
invalidated.
The third interest the Beaumont Court recognized in upholding
the ban on corporate general fund contributions was the interest in
preventing "'undue influence on an officeholder's judgment, and the
806. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 154 (2003).
807. Id.
808. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 911.
809. Id.
810. Id. (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)).
811. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 911.
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appearance of such influence."'812 Citizens United explicitly rejected this
rationale. It reiterated that the only interest in restricting First
Amendment political speech and association is the interest in preventing
quid pro quo corruption." 3 The Citizens United Court then ruled that
"influence" does not indicate such corruption. "The fact that speakers
may have influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that
these officials are corrupt[.]" 8 14 The government cannot rely on an anti-
influence rationale to restrict First Amendment activity because
"[i]ngratiation and access . . . are not corruption."8 15 In fact, "'a
substantial and legitimate reason' that one makes a contribution to, or
votes for, one candidate instead of another is the hope that the candidate
will generate the political outcomes that the contributor prefers.816 There
is nothing wrong with that and no constitutionally permissible interest in
preventing it. The anti-influence rationale is therefore an invalid interest
for restricting First Amendment activity and could not be used to support
section 44 1b's ban on corporate independent expenditures.
The Beaumont Court relied upon this interest to uphold section
441b's ban on corporate contributions. In the wake of Citizens United,
the interest is no longer valid and cannot support the corporate
contribution ban.
d. Beaumont relied upon the anti-circumvention interest, which
Citizens United discredited.
The final interest that the Beaumont Court relied upon in
upholding section 441 b was the anti-circumvention interest.817 The Court
opined that "restricting contributions by various organizations hedges
against their use as conduits for 'circumvention of [valid] contribution
limits'.",RlR This created the possibility, the Court feared, that the
812. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 156 (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v.
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 440-41 (2001)).
813. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 909.
814. Id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 910.
815. Id.
816. Id. (quoting McConnell v. Fed Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 297
(2003), overruled in part by Citizens United, 558 U.S. _ 130 S. Ct. 876).
817. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 155.
818. Id. (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Republican Fed. Campaign
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corporate owners or employees could exceed their personal contribution
limit by funneling money through the corporation.819
This rationale made no sense even at the time Beaumont was
decided. Section 441b's ban on corporate contributions explicitly
allowed for (1) corporations to create PACs; (2) corporate owners and
employees to donate to these PACs; and (3) these PACs to make
contributions. Thus, the danger of circumvention was not cured by
section 441b's ban on corporate contributions. Instead of allowing
corporate owners and employees to funnel contributions through
corporations, section 441b allowed them to funnel contributions through
PACs. The ban therefore did nothing to further the anti-circumvention
interest. It should therefore have been invalidated.
Citizens United further explained the deficiency of the anti-
circumvention interest when it noted that "[p]olitical speech is so
ingrained in our culture that speakers find ways to circumvent campaign
finance laws."820 This means that laws designed to prevent
circumvention are under-inclusive to that interest because speakers find
ways around them. The anti-circumvention interest is therefore
constitutionally infirm, if not invalid, and has been discredited.
Beaumont, however, inappropriately relied upon it to uphold the ban on
corporate general-fund contributions. Such reliance was misplaced.
Beaumont thus rests on a now-rejected principle (that
government may discriminate among speakers and so ban corporate
general-flmd speech) flowing from a now-rejected premise (that PACs
can engage in expressive activity for the organization that creates them).
It found corruption where none exists, accepting the theory that the
corporate form, by itself, is somehow corrupting. It relied on three
constitutionally invalid interests (the antidistortion, the anti-influence,
and the shareholder protection interests), and one that, if not actually
invalid, is at least infirm (the anti-circumvention interest). It was
analytically flawed even at the time it was decided and cannot survive
Citizens United. Beaumont should therefore be reconsidered and
overruled.
Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 456 n.18 (2001)).
819. Id.
820. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 912.
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CONCLUSION
The Citizens United Court clarified the contours of corporate
campaign finance law, holding: "We return to the principle established in
Buckley and Bellotti that the Government may not suppress political
speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity." 8 21 As the law of
campaign finance continues to develop, it must do so in ways that do not
discriminate against speakers, including corporations. Rather, it must
recognize that the First Amendment protects speech and association,
regardless of who is speaking and associating. As courts evaluate
campaign finance laws, they should apply Citizens United's speech-
protective principles. This will necessitate reconsidering and overruling
Beaumont and declaring that the federal ban on corporate contributions is
unconstitutional.
821. Id. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
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